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During the 2016 presidential election, the Russian
government deployed internet trolls to “[a]mplify” the vaccine
debate in an effort to divide Americans.1 The Russian trolls
tweeted that “there was a secret government database of
#vaccine-damaged children” and that pharmaceutical companies
develop vaccines for “cash, not to prevent deaths,” among other
vaccine conspiracies in an attempt to sow discord among the
electorate.2 Public health advocates have linked the Russian
“anti-vax” campaign to deadly measles outbreaks, highlighting
the dangers of so-called “vaccine hesitancy” and the anti-
vaccination movement.3 The Russians exploited the fact that, as
one medical doctor put it, “a tiny minority continue to put the rest
of us at risk.”4 Experts warn that “anti-vaxxers” pose a serious
† Eugene McCarthy is an Assistant Professor of Business Law at James
Madison University. J.D., UCLA; Ph.D., Berkeley.
1 David A. Broniatowski et al., Weaponized Health Communication: Twitter
Bots and Russian Trolls Amplify the Vaccine Debate, 108 AM. J. OF PUB. HEALTH 1378,
1378–79 (2018).
2 Id. at 1383.
3 Kashmira Gander, Russian Trolls and Bots Spread Anti-Vaccine Lies on Twitter
in Run-Up to 2016 Election, NEWSWEEK (Aug. 23, 2018, 4:00 PM),
https://www.newsweek.com/russian-trolls-and-bots-spread-anti-vaccine-lies-twitter-run-2016-
election-1088082 [https://perma.cc/3BQ2-3SNV]. The World Health Organization (WHO)
defines “vaccine hesitancy” as a “delay in acceptance or refusal of vaccines despite availability of
vaccination services. Vaccine hesitancy is complex and context specific, varying across time,
place and vaccines. It is influenced by factors such as complacency, convenience and confidence.”
WORLD HEALTH ORG., REPORT OF THE SAGE WORKING GROUP ON VACCINE HESITANCY 59
(2014), https://www.who.int/immunization/sage/meetings/2014/october/SAGE_working_group_
revised_report_vaccine_hesitancy.pdf?ua=1 [https://perma.cc/PTU8-6KB3]. The term “anti-
vaxxer” as used in this article connotes a colloquial use of the term as it has evolved in popular
culture and does not appear in the source material. This article will use the term
interchangeably with “vaccine-hesitant” or “vaccine critics” to refer to individuals who oppose
government-mandated vaccination.
4 Arthur Caplan, Liability for Failure to Vaccinate, HARV. L. PETRIE–FLOM CTR.
BILLOFHEALTH (May 23, 2013), https://blog.petrieflom.law.harvard.edu/2013/05/23/liability-
for-failure-to-vaccinate/ [https://perma.cc/L8DP-47YL].
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public health threat, one that will continue to grow if the
government does not stop this small, but vocal, minority.5
The threat is legitimate, as vaccines are indispensable
public health tools. According to the U.S. Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention (CDC), every year U.S. vaccines prevent
42,000 deaths, 20 million illnesses, $14 billion in medical costs,
and $69 billion in social costs.6 Public health scholars point to
these outcomes to demonstrate that vaccines are extremely safe
and effective public health interventions—despite Russian
attempts to convince Americans otherwise.7 Indeed, these same
scholars observe that “[f]ew dispute that vaccinations are one of
the greatest public health achievements of all time, perhaps
ranking second only to the advent of clean water.”8 So why would
the Russians seek to “amplify” a vaccine debate that appeals
only to a fringe group of misinformed parents?
The Russians targeted this debate, perhaps, because no
such public consensus regarding vaccine safety and efficacy exists
in the United States. Remarkably, a large group of Americans
dispute both the safety, efficacy, and even the necessity of
childhood vaccines. A recent peer-reviewed epidemiological study
found that almost four out of five parents in the United States
have concerns about vaccines.9 Instead of a tiny minority, a
majority (52 percent) of American parents believe that the
government should permit them to refuse vaccines that are today
required by law.10 Two out of five parents delay childhood
vaccinations.11 (Indeed, 4 percent of U.S. pediatricians refuse
vaccinations for their own children.)12 Many assume that anti-
vaxxers are “ill-informed dilettantes clinging to unscientific
Internet chatter or a debunked study that linked vaccines and
autism.”13 Instead, studies routinely demonstrate that vaccine-
5 James Lobo, Vindicating the Vaccine: Injecting Strength Into Mandatory School
VaccinationRequirements to Safeguard the PublicHealth, 57B.C.L.REV. 261, 262–64 (2016).
6 Nili Karako-Eyal, Increasing Vaccination Rates Through Tort Law:
Theoretical and Empirical Insights, 86 UMKC L. REV. 1, 6 (2017).
7 See Steve P. Calandrillo, Vanishing Vaccinations: Why Are So Many Americans
Opting Out of Vaccinating Their Children?, 37 U.MICH. J. L. REFORM 353, 427–29 (2004).
8 Id. at 438.
9 Daniel A. Salmon et al., Vaccine Hesitancy Causes, Consequences, and a Call
to Action, 33 VACCINE D66, D67 (2015) (this study used data from 2010 and surveyed
parents with children ages 1–6 years old).
10 Louise Kuo Habakus &Mary Holland, The Case for Vaccine Choice, in VACCINE
EPIDEMIC: HOW CORPORATE GREED, BIASED SCIENCE, AND COERCIVE GOVERNMENT
THREATEN OUR HUMAN RIGHTS, OUR HEALTH, AND OUR CHILDREN 1, 10 (Louise Kuo
Habakus et al. eds., 2d ed. 2012).
11 See Salmon et al., supra note 9, at D68 (this study used data from 2009).
12 Douglas S. Diekema, Responding to Parental Refusals of Immunization of
Children, 115 PEDIATRICS 1428, 1428 (2005).
13 Efthimios Parasidis, Recalibrating Vaccination Laws, 97 B.U. L. REV. 2153,
2162 (2017).
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hesitant parents are typicallymarriedmothers with substantially
higher education levels, higher household incomes, and more
parental experience than parents without vaccine concerns.14
These statistics challenge the traditional anti-vaxxer narrative
described above, which is that the vaccine-hesitant are
misinformed about vaccines and science. Indeed, the inquiry
should not ask why a fringe minority of conspiracy theorists
ignore science, but rather why a majority of parents (consisting of
the most educated, experienced, and financially secure ones)
harbor skepticism about U.S. vaccine policy.
This article argues that U.S. vaccine legislation directly
produces (and perpetuates) vaccine hesitancy. The laws that
govern and regulate vaccines in the United States foster a false
perception of government overreach, fraud, and corruption. U.S.
vaccine policy rests precariously—and unnecessarily—on the legal
foundations of strict immunization mandates, lax regulatory
oversight, and blanket limited liability for vaccine manufacturers.
These legal structures facilitate widespread and systemic doubt
about childhood vaccines. They also enable some parents to claim
that the government prioritizes pharmaceutical industry interests
and abstract notions of public health over the concerns of
individual Americans. As a result, these legal structures have
transformed vaccination—a modern medical miracle—into a locus
of distrust and confusion that is turning the nation’s most educated
parents against an indispensable public health tool.15 Indeed, in the
midst of the COVID-19 pandemic, 44 percent of Americans would
14 SeePhilip J. Smith et al.,The Association Between Intentional Delay of Vaccine
Administration and Timely Childhood Vaccination Coverage, 125 PUB. HEALTH REP. 534,
539 (2010); see also Jessica E. Atwell et al., Nonmedical Vaccine Exemptions and Pertussis
in California, 2010, 132 PEDIATRICS 624, 628 (2013) (noting that vaccine-hesitant parents
tend to be associated with factors such as a “higher percentage of high school, college, or
graduate school graduates; higher median household income; and lower percentage of
families in poverty”); Philip J. Smith et al., Children Who Have Received No Vaccines: Who
Are They and Where Do They Live?, 114 PEDIATRICS 187, 187 (2004) (“Unvaccinated
children tended to be white, to have a mother who was married and had a college degree,
to live in a household with an annual income exceeding $75,000, and to have parents who
expressed concerns regarding the safety of vaccines and indicated that medical doctors
have little influence over vaccination decisions for their children.”); Philip J. Smith et al.,
Parental Delay or Refusal of Vaccine Doses, Childhood Vaccination Coverage at 24 Months
of Age, and the Health Belief Model, 126 PUB.HEALTHREP. 135, 139–40 (2011) (“Generally,
the consecutive ordering of parental/delay refusal described previously defined a
continuum that also was associated with factors related to higher socioeconomic status. For
example, children whose parents delayed and refused vaccines were significantly more
likely to live in a household with an annual income >400% of the federal poverty level; to
have a mother who was married, 30 years of age, English-speaking, or a college graduate;
to be covered by private health insurance; and to live in a household with 4 children who
were 18 years of age or younger. Also, children whose parents delayed and refused were
more likely to be of non-Hispanic white race/ethnicity than those who neither delayed nor
refused.” (internal citations omitted)).
15 See sources cited supra note 14.
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refuse a vaccine due to concerns about government vaccine
policies.16 U.S. vaccine legislation is, in and of itself, a dangerous
public health crisis that directly produces vaccine hesitancy.
This argument has four major components. Part I
examines the nature and extent of U.S. vaccine mandates. The
government mandates childhood vaccines to ensure widespread
“herd immunity.” However, the United States is a global outlier
with regard to imposing extensive vaccine mandates on its
population. As a result, vaccine critics argue that U.S.
compulsory vaccination policy unduly infringes upon individual
liberty. Part II investigates vaccine testing and approval
protocols. Critics believe that industry-sponsored clinical trials
that test vaccine safety and efficacy are subject to fraud due to
the financial conflicts of interest that occasionally arise in
vaccine approval procedures. Part III discusses legislation, like
the National Childhood Vaccination Injury Act of 1986, which
eliminates drug company liability for vaccine-related injuries.
This legislation shifts risk away from drug companies, since the
government (not the pharmaceutical industry) compensates
injury victims with taxpayer money. Some parents feel that this
risk allotment negates the industry’s commitment to vaccine
safety and innovation. Part IV demonstrates how these legal
structures—compulsion, lax oversight, and limited liability—
sometimes converge and produce conspicuous social movements
that cast doubt on vaccines. This is evident in the rise of
pervasive distrust in the United States related to both autism
and the flu shot. The recognition that these legal structures
produce and foment unnecessary suspicions about vaccines is
the first step in mitigating this public health crisis. If the
government makes changes to one or more of these three legal
structures, it can reduce (and potentially eliminate) vaccine
hesitancy in the United States.
I. VACCINE MANDATES
Vaccine compulsion is the first legal structure that
produces vaccine hesitancy in the United States. Vaccine-hesitant
parents claim that immunization mandates undermine
fundamental individual liberties and violate the right to informed
medical consent.17 Additionally, the U.S. vaccine mandate
16 LauraSanthanam,WhyAmericansHaveGrownMoreHesitantAboutTheCOVID-
19 Vaccine, PBS (Oct. 9, 2020, 4:57 PM), https://www.pbs.org/newshour/health/why-americans-
have-grown-more-hesitant-about-the-covid-19-vaccine [https://perma.cc/KCP5-GQJV].
17 Kyla L. Kelch, Privacy Implications of Mandatory Immunizations, Exemptions,
and Immunization InformationSystems, 4 I/S: J. L.&POL’YFORINFO.SOC’Y851, 866–67 (2008).
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diverges from the voluntary vaccine policies that most other
developed democratic nations employ.18 The federal government
currently recommends (and all fifty states legally require) that
parents vaccinate their children against a variety of diseases
before enrolling them in school or daycare.19 These mandates
mirror the CDC vaccine schedule and typically require parents to
vaccinate children against sixteen diseases: Diphtheria,
Haemophilus influenzae type b (Hib), Hepatitis A, Hepatitis B,
Human Papillomavirus (HPV), Influenza (flu), Measles,
Meningococcal Disease, Mumps, Pertussis (whooping cough),
Polio, Pneumococcal, Rotavirus, Rubella, Tetanus, and Varicella
(chicken pox).20 Government agencies argue that public health
outcomes justify these extensive mandates. The CDC estimates
that these vaccines have prevented 732,000 deaths in the United
States between 1994 and 2014.21
A. Vaccine Science
Vaccines are effective from a public health perspective
because immunization is preventative. Vaccines deliberately
introduce a similar or weakened form of a virus or bacteria into
a healthy person’s system, which produces antibodies that give
them immunity if or when they encounter that disease later in
life.22 Public health history confirms that vaccines work, as they
have dramatically reduced morbidity and mortality rates of some of
the worst diseases in history by preventing them on the front end. The
benefits have been remarkable: millions of deaths have been
prevented, millions more lives markedly improved, and billions of
dollars of societal resources have been saved for use in countless other
valuable endeavors.23
Vaccines have essentially eliminated deadly diseases like
polio and smallpox in the United States, dramatically improving
18 Frej Klem Thomsen, Childhood Immunization, Vaccine Hesitancy, and
Provaccination Policy in High-Income Countries, 23 PSYCHOL.PUB.POL’Y&L. 324, 330 (2017).
19 OFFICE FOR STATE, TRIBAL, LOCAL & TERRITORIAL SUPPORT, CTRS. FOR DISEASE
CONTROL & PREVENTION, STATE SCHOOL IMMUNIZATION REQUIREMENTS AND VACCINE
EXEMPTION LAWS 7–9 (2015), http://www.cdc.gov/phlp/docs/school-vaccinations.pdf [https://
perma.cc/TF9X-U9GP]. The District of Columbia likewisemandates vaccines. Id. at 7.
20 See 2020 Recommended Vaccinations for Infants and Children (Birth Though 6
years) Parent-Friendly Version, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL &PREVENTION, https://www.cdc.
gov/vaccines/schedules/easy-to-read/child-easyread.html [https://perma.cc/59KZ-DC9A]; see also
2020 Recommended Vaccinations for Children (7–18 Years Old) Parent-Friendly Version, CTRS.
FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, https://www.cdc.gov/vaccines/schedules/easy-to-
read/adolescent-easyread.html [https://perma.cc/C64V-F93S].
21 Erwin Chemerinsky & Michele Goodwin, Compulsory Vaccination Laws Are
Constitutional, 110 NW. U. L. REV. 589, 600 (2016).
22 See Calandrillo, supra note 7, at 362–63.
23 Id. at 369.
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the nation’s public health.24 Indeed, given these public health
outcomes, “[o]ne cannot overestimate the beneficial changes
vaccines have introduced into our lives.”25
Childhood immunizations are also extremely cost-effective
public health interventions. Some estimates suggest that “[t]he
measles vaccine alone has saved the United States billions of
dollars,” while the polio vaccine has produced trillions of dollars
in national savings.26 Some immunizations produce a ratio as high
as $27 saved for every $1 the nation spends on the vaccine.27
In addition to being inexpensive, vaccines are relatively
safe. As with all medications, vaccines do cause occasional
adverse reactions in children, but public health advocates attest
that these negative outcomes are generally minor and
statistically rare.28 As such, “research overwhelmingly has
shown that the public health benefit of administering vaccines
outweighs the marginal risks imposed by them.”29 This low-cost,
low-risk, and high-reward profile appears to be the driving force
behind U.S. vaccine mandates.
B. The History of U.S. Vaccine Mandates
Compulsory immunization laws in the United States
became the standard approach to disease prevention in the late
1960s, after states with vaccine mandates presented up to 51
percent fewer cases of measles than states without mandates.30
However, the legal precedent establishing a state’s right to
administer compulsory vaccines dates back to 1905.31 In Jacobson
v. Massachusetts, a Massachusetts resident challenged a state law
requiring adults to get the smallpox vaccine or pay a $5 fine.32 The
Court upheld the state law as constitutional and determined that
states have the power to enact a compulsory vaccination law.33
In 1922, the Court again addressed compulsory vaccine
laws in Zucht v. King.34 This case differed from Jacobson, as it
involved a state law mandating children receive vaccinations in
24 Id. at 366, 375.
25 Dorit Rubinstein Reiss & Lois A. Weithorn, Responding to the Childhood
Vaccination Crisis: Legal Frameworks and Tools in the Context of Parental Vaccine Refusal, 63
BUFF.L.REV. 881, 886 (2015).
26 See Calandrillo, supra note 7, at 380–81.
27 Id. at 380.
28 See Parasidis, supra note 13, at 2241; see also Karako-Eyal, supra note 6.
29 See Lobo, supra note 5, at 272.
30 See Calandrillo, supra note 7, at 382.
31 See generally Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905).
32 Id. at 12.
33 Id. at 39.
34 See generally Zucht v. King, 260 U.S. 174 (1922).
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order to attend school.35 The government typically defers to
parental judgment with regard to healthcare decisions concerning
their children, but Zuchtmade vaccines the rare exception to this
rule.36 In upholding the vaccination law, the Court established
that states can impose childhood vaccine mandates as
preventative measures against disease, thereby establishing
lasting precedent on the issue.37 Zucht also made compliance with
the vaccine mandate a valid prerequisite for school attendance.38
Courts have consistently reinforced the rule that a state can
implement any mandatory vaccination policy it deems necessary
to ensure public health.39 As a result, “[b]y the mid-1950s, it was
arguably settled law that school vaccination mandates were
presumptively valid.”40 This presumption remains in effect today
and states have nearly unbridled discretion with regard to
imposing childhood vaccine mandates.41
C. The Herd Immunity Theory
Vaccine mandates are necessary to ensure “herd
immunity.”42 Herd immunity is the primary scientific rationale
behind compulsory vaccination laws.43 The theory is that if
enough people in a population are immune from an infection, the
disease cannot easily spread.44 If there is widespread immunity,
then there will be an insufficient number of hosts to carry and
transmit the infection from person to person.45 This prophylactic
barrier protects members of the “herd” who are too young to
receive the vaccine or who are otherwise immunocompromised
and cannot participate in immunization programs.46 The
threshold for achieving herd immunity varies from disease to
disease, but vaccination rates (and, therefore, immunity rates)
35 Id. at 175.
36 Id. at 176–77; see Reiss & Weithorn, supra note 25, at 909.
37 JamesMuela,Updating Vaccine Law: Restructuring Jacobson v. Massachusetts
to Create a Safe Harbor for States, 69 BAYLORL. REV. 462, 464 (2017).
38 Id.
39 See, e.g., Sadlock v. Bd. of Educ. of Borough of Carlstadt, 58 A.2d 218, 220–
22 (N.J. 1948) (holding that a New Jersey school vaccine mandate “was a proper exercise
of the police power for the protection of the public welfare and will be sustained”).
40 Mary Holland, Compulsory Vaccination, The Constitution, and the Hepatitis B
Mandate for Infants and Young Children, 12 YALEJ.HEALTHPOL’Y, L.&ETHICS 39, 52 (2012).
41 SeeMuela, supra note 37, at 467.
42 Elizabeth Hatch, To Vaccinate or Not to Vaccinate?: The Challenges and Benefits




46 See Chemerinsky & Goodwin, supra note 21.
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must generally cover 80–99 percent of the population.47 For
measles, the herd immunity threshold sits somewhere between
83–94 percent; for whooping cough, it ranges from 92–94 percent
of the population.48 Indeed, many U.S. public health advocates
unwaveringly embrace vaccine mandates because of the herd
immunity theory, since
herd immunity can exist only if a sufficiently high proportion of the
population is immunized such that the transmission of the disease is
effectively interrupted. Therefore, society cannot allow every one of its
members (or even a sizeable minority) to rely on the indirect
protection afforded by other vaccinated members of the herd—because
then community protection unravels as all try to “free ride” off of the
benevolent acts of others.49
States institute strong laws to prevent individuals from forgoing
vaccination because the potential social costs of the free rider
problem are high.50
In the past, state vaccine mandates included medical,
religious, and/or philosophical exemptions, but today public
health advocates are calling for states to eliminate nonmedical
exemptions for children based largely on herd immunity
justifications.51 Following the 2014–2015 California measles
outbreak, legal scholars Erwin Chemerinsky and Michelle
Goodwin urged “every state to revise its vaccination law to make
sure that every child, and every person, is vaccinated unless there
is a medical reason not to do so.”52 In 2015, California passed
Senate Bill 277, which restructured religious and personal belief
exemptions, making them more difficult to obtain from the State
Department of Public Health.53 Indeed, public health experts
assert that Senate Bill 277’s restructuring eliminated the
personal belief exemption.54 Mississippi and West Virginia have
likewise eliminated religious and personal belief exemptions.55
Washington eliminated personal belief exemptions for some
vaccines in 2019.56 Maine is scheduled to eliminate personal belief
47 Mary Holland & Chase E. Zachary, Herd Immunity and Compulsory
Childhood Vaccination: Does the Theory Justify the Law?, 93 OR. L. REV. 1, 17 (2014).
48 Id.
49 See Calandrillo, supra note 7, at 420 (emphasis added).
50 See Holland & Zachary, supra note 47, at 10.
51 See Chemerinsky & Goodwin, supra note 21, at 597–98, 615.
52 Id. at 615.
53 See S.B. 277, 2015–16 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2015).
54 Pamela McDonald et al., Exploring California’s New Law Eliminating
Personal Belief Exemptions to Childhood Vaccines and Vaccine Decision-Making Among
Homeschooling Mothers in California, 37 VACCINE 742, 743 (2019).
55 See Chemerinsky & Goodwin, supra note 21, at 598.
56 MMR Vaccine Exemption Law Change 2019, WASH. STATE DEP’T OF HEALTH,
https://www.doh.wa.gov/CommunityandEnvironment/Schools/Immunization/ExemptionL
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vaccine exemptions in 2021.57 Meanwhile, the Food and Drug
Administration (FDA) indicated that the “[f]ederal [g]overnment
may try to intervene if states refuse to reconsider laws that allow
for exemptions from vaccination requirements.”58 Almost in
lockstep, public health advocates and scholars are calling for
states to abolish vaccine exemptions, both religious and
philosophical.59 Even in states where exemptions still exist,
government institutions obstruct access to them.60 Some
pediatricians have stated that they will file a child neglect report
with the state if parents refuse to vaccinate their child or seek to
delay vaccinations.61 In the name of herd immunity, states are
strengthening vaccine mandates and curtailing exemptions to
protect the public health.
D. Objections to U.S. Vaccine Mandates
1. Informed Medical Consent
Vaccine critics view the legal compulsion to immunize
children as a violation of a parent’s fundamental civil liberties
awChange#:~:text=In%20May%202019%2C%20the%20Washington,private%20schools%
20and%20child%20cares [https://perma.cc/L89B-83R8].
57 Evan Simko-Bednarski, Maine Bars Residents from Opting Out of
Immunizations for Religious or Philosophical Reasons, CNN (May 27, 2019, 11:36 AM),
https://www.cnn.com/2019/05/27/health/maine-immunization-exemption-repealed-
trnd/index.html [https://perma.cc/M7VA-36DX].
58 Megan Trimble, FDA Commissioner: Government May Act if States Don’t
Change Vaccine Laws, U.S. NEWS (Feb. 20, 2019), https://www.usnews.com/news/national-
news/articles/2019-02-20/fda-commissioner-government-may-act-if-states-dont-strengthen-
vaccine-laws [https://perma.cc/YZ2T-LLHM].
59 Hillel Y. Levin, Why Some Religious Accommodations for Mandatory
Vaccinations Violate the Establishment Clause, 68 HASTINGSL.J. 1193, 1196 (2017) (noting
that this article “offers a practical foundation for challenging religious accommodations in
the vaccination context in order to protect vulnerable children from contracting preventable
diseases”); see also Victor Diego Gonzalez, Note, Religion in the Time of Measles:
Prescriptions for Minimizing the Public Health Threats Associated with Religious
Exemptions fromMandatory Vaccinations, 15 CARDOZOPUB. L. POL’Y&ETHICS J. 413, 418
(2017) (calling “for the elimination of philosophical exemptions to mandatory vaccination
laws, a strengthening of the standards used in determining bona fide religious exemptions,
and the adoption of exemplary policies from various states that decrease the public health
risks that religious exemptions pose”).
60 SeeHabakus&Holland, supra note 10, at 3. At a recent Senate hearing, Senator
Rand Paul (who is a physician) expressed misgivings about government vaccine compulsion;
see also Igor Derysh, Sen. Bill Cassidy, An Actual Physician, Schools Rand Paul Over Anti-
Vaxxer Claims, SALON (Mar. 6, 2019, 11:00 AM), https://www.salon.com/2019/03/06/sen-bill-
cassidy-an-actual-physician-schools-rand-paul-over-anti-vaxxer-claims/ [https://perma.cc/ST
R9-QXCS]. Paul noted that “[a]swe contemplate forcing parents to choose this or that vaccine,
I think it’s important to remember that force is not consistent with the American story, nor is
force consistent with the liberty our forefathers sought when they came to America.” Id.
61 Sara Schreiber, Pediatrician’s Extreme Stance on Anti-Vaxxers Has Riled People
Up, GOOD HOUSEKEEPING (Apr. 21, 2017), https://www.goodhousekeeping.com/health/news/a
43825/pediatrician-vaccines-viral/ [https://perma.cc/4TAD-X5Y5].
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and as a denial of informed medical consent.62 These concerns
are not isolated to contemporary vaccine mandates. Indeed, the
aforementioned plaintiff in Jacobson objected to the state-
mandated smallpox vaccine on these very grounds, noting that
the vaccine mandate violated his personal liberty and bodily
integrity.63 Vaccine mandates are sometimes met with
resistance because the government is compelling a healthy
person to engage in a preemptive medical intervention that may
in fact harm them.64 Some believe, as Jacobson did, that “[a]ll
medical interventions, including vaccination, require free and
informed consent. To abridge that right is to violate the essential
human rights to life, liberty, and bodily integrity. By denying
truly free and informed consent to vaccination, U.S. vaccine
policy violates fundamental rights.”65 This response is perhaps
not surprising given the fact that the nation’s constitutional
structure aims to promote the twin concepts of limited
government power and expansive individual civil liberties.66
Indeed, the Supreme Court has recognized that Americans have
a constitutional right to refuse any unwanted medical
treatment—except, that is, for vaccines.67
2. Immunization Policies in Peer Nations
As it turns out, compulsion is not consistent with vaccine
policies in most other nations. In fact, while other nations do
require parents to vaccinate their children against some diseases,
the United States is the only developed democratic nation that
compels parents to vaccinate their children against such a large
number of diseases.68 Great Britain, for instance, does not have a
mandatory vaccine policy.69 Instead, the government “officially
recommend[s]” that its citizens vaccinate their children “for the
good of society.”70 Until recently, the German government
likewise had no vaccine mandates, asking instead only that
62 See Holland & Zachary, supra note 47, at 36.
63 See Holland, supra note 40, at 45.
64 Heidi J. Larson et al., Addressing the Vaccine Confidence Gap, 378 LANCET,
526, 526–27 (2011).
65 See Habakus & Holland, supra note 10, at 1.
66 Lawrence M. Friedman, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 89 (4th ed. 2019).
67 Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dept. of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 278 (1990); Prince v.
Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 167–70 (1944) (holding that the Constitution does not permit
a parent to expose the community or one’s children to harm from disease).
68 See Holland & Zachary, supra note 47, at 5–6.
69 Rob Henson, Inoculated Against Recovery: A Comparative Analysis of
Vaccine Injury Compensation in the United States and Britain, 15 TULSA J. COMP. &
INT’L L. 61, 61–62 (2007).
70 Id.
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parents submit proof to the child’s school that they consulted a
doctor about the benefits of vaccines.71 However, in March 2020,
the German government began mandating the measles vaccine
for school children.72 Australia also has no vaccine mandates and
instead incentivizes vaccination by offering tax-exempt payments
to parents who comply with government vaccine
recommendations.73 Russia—the nation that amplified the U.S.
vaccine debate—similarly permits parents to decline childhood
vaccinations.74 After protracted national debate and outcry, the
Italian government continues to pursue an effective mandatory
vaccination program.75
Some nations that purport to have “mandatory”
vaccination laws, such as Latvia, admit that they do not enforce
these mandates.76 If they did enforce the mandates,
noncompliance would result in a small fine—not (as in the United
States) the denial of the right to childhood education in the
nation’s public school system.77 Nations that do enforce mandates
generally do so only for a small number of immunizations.
Belgium, for instance, requires just one childhood vaccine (polio)
throughout the country, in contrast to the sixteen childhood
vaccines typically mandated in the United States.78 France
recently joined the United States in mandating a large number of
childhood vaccines, but many French doctors fear “that the
measure is authoritarian and could backfire, not least by
71 Susan Scutti, How Countries Around the World Try to Encourage Vaccination,
CNN (Jan. 2, 2018, 3:32 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2017/06/06/health/vaccine-uptake-
incentives/index.html [https://perma.cc/QZ98-64RR] (detailing nation-by-nation approach to
vaccine legislation).
72 Jasmin Bauomy, Measles Vaccination Becomes Mandatory in Germany,
EURONEWS (Mar. 2, 2020), https://www.euronews.com/2020/03/02/measles-vaccination-
becomes-mandatory-in-germany [https://perma.cc/TQ7V-MLRE] (detailing how Germany now
requires themeasles vaccine for school children, subjecting noncompliant parents to a fine).
73 Erin Walkinshaw, Mandatory Vaccinations: The International Landscape,
183 CANADIAN MED. ASS’N J. E1167, E1167 (2011).
74 Evan Gershkovich, Russia Has a Vaccination Problem, MOSCOWTIMES (Sept. 28,
2018), https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2018/09/28/russia-has-a-vaccine-problem-a63017 [htt
ps://perma.cc/FX96-ADKS].
75 Gianluca Mezzofiore,Why Italy’s U-Turn on Mandatory Vaccination Shocks the
Scientific Community, CNN (Aug. 7, 2018, 1:59 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2018/08/07/health
/italy-anti-vaccine-law-measles-intl/index.html [https://perma.cc/26A2-6W2G]. However, this
matter appears to remain in flux. InMarch 2019, the Italian government considered changing
its mind (at least temporarily) once again. See Nick Squires, Italy’s Populist Coalition
Renounces Anti-Vaccination Stance Amid Measles ‘Emergency’, TELEGRAPH (Nov. 15, 2018,
5:31 PM), https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2018/11/15/italys-populist-coalition-renounces-
anti-vaccination-stance/ [https://perma.cc/V42X-SCHW].
76 SeeWalkinshaw, supra note 73.
77 Id.
78 See id. at E1168;Vaccinations in Belgium, EXPATICA (Nov. 17, 2020), https://www.
expatica.com/be/healthcare/healthcare-basics/vaccinations-in-belgium-105159/
[https://perma.cc/8VSC-UK9E] (noting that “[o]nly one vaccination is mandatory throughout
Belgium: polio”); sources cited supra note 20.
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alienating parents and increasing wariness of vaccines in a
country where various health scandals . . . have spread mistrust
of health authorities.”79 In the wake of the law, France now ranks
among the most vaccine-hesitant nations in Europe.80 Japan is
likewise reticent to impose large-scale vaccine mandates, such
that “[m]any common vaccines, including those for measles,
mumps, and rubella (MMR), the inactivated poliovirus vaccine,
and combination vaccines are not yet available in Japan.”81 The
United States stands out among high-income democratic nations
with regard to imposing such far-reaching vaccine mandates.82
3. Challenges to the Herd Immunity Theory
According to some vaccine critics, many of these nations
might avoid imposing compulsory vaccination laws because herd
immunity, the key justification for compulsory childhood vaccines,
is presently unattainable.83 Other nations aim to achieve “herd
effect,” which limits outbreaks and requires lower vaccination rates
and less extensive public healthmandates.84 TheU.S. policy, critics
argue, will never achieve herd immunity because the nation
staggers the timing of childhood vaccines and because vaccines
offer imperfect immunity (and sometimes no immunity at all)
against many diseases.85 As such, the impracticability of attaining
herd immunity has caused “many researchers to reject the theory
[of herd immunity] altogether.”86 SomeU.S. disease outbreaks lend
credence to skepticism about herd immunity. Public health officials
have recorded measles outbreaks in school populations where the
vaccination rates were 99 percent and 100 percent, respectively.87
79 Laws are Not the Only Way to Boost Immunization, NATURE (Jan. 17, 2018),
https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-018-00660-y [https://perma.cc/2AMX-379H].
80 AURORAMANTAS, EUR.HEALTHMGMT.ASS’N,VACCINEHESITANCY INEUROPE
1 (2017), https://ehma.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/Vaccine-Hesitancy-in-Europe_-Fin
al.pdf [https://perma.cc/J4BD-TPTA].
81 Rumiko Shimazawa & Masayuki Ikeda, The Vaccine Gap Between Japan
and the UK, 107 HEALTH POL’Y 312, 312 (2012).
82 See Thomsen, supra note 18.
83 See Holland & Zachary, supra note 47, at 4–5 (noting that “[g]iven
contemporary, imperfect vaccine technology and geographical and age-stratified
vaccination mandates, herd immunity does not exist and is not attainable,” and that “[o]ur
viewpoint may help explain why many developed countries, including those with political
systems closest to our own, have only voluntary childhood vaccination programs”).
84 T. Jacob John & Reuben Samuel, Herd Immunity and Herd Effect: New
Insights and Definitions, 16 EUR. J. EPIDEMIOLOGY 601, 601 (2000).
85 Id. at 605.
86 See Holland & Zachary, supra note 47, at 19.
87 Tracy L. Gustafson et al., Measles Outbreak in a Fully Immunized Secondary
School Population, 316 NEW ENG. J. MED. 771, 771 (1987); Measles Outbreak Among
Vaccinated High School Students–Illinois, CTRS. FORDISEASECONTROL&PREVENTION:
MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WK. REP. (June 22, 1984), http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/
mmwrhtml/00000359.htm [https://perma.cc/AKU2-VRGC] (detailing the government
2020] REGULATORY PRODUCTION OF VACCINE HESITANCY 93
In response, the CDC conceded that measles can occur even with
100 percent vaccine compliance.88
Indeed, the phenomenon of “vaccine failure” is a consistent
public health reality in theUnited States.89 Recentwhooping cough
outbreaks demonstrate the phenomenon of vaccine failure and the
limits of the herd immunity theory. In 2010, California experienced
a large whooping cough outbreak, prompting some to blame
vaccine-hesitant parents for the state’s lack of herd immunity
against whooping cough.90 Scientists later found that the outbreaks
arose because the whooping cough vaccine—which has been in use
for two decades—simply does not work very well.91 In fact, repeated
studies of the whooping cough vaccine show that it offers only a
small amount of immunity for one year and essentially no
immunity against the disease just “2–3 years after vaccination.”92
The same phenomenon occurred during a mumps outbreak in a
population in which every infected child had been vaccinated
against the disease, prompting the CDC to issue a statement
“conced[ing] that the mumps portion of the [measles, mumps,
rubella (MMR)] vaccine is less effective than the other parts.”93
4. U.S. Public Health Outcomes
The U.S. approach toward vaccine mandates breeds
widespread doubt about the efficacy of immunizations. Some of
these misgivings revolve around the fact that the United States,
despite its vaccine mandates, has poor health outcomes for both
infants and adults relative to peer nations. Vaccine critics who
observe that the United States is a global outlier with regard to
its compulsory vaccine laws point to the government’s alarming
summary of themeasles outbreak and the hard-to-explain outcomegiven the high vaccination
rates at the school).
88 See Measles Outbreak Among Vaccinated High School Students–Illinois,
supra note 87.
89 See Karako-Eyal, supra note 6, at 4.
90 Jessica E. Atwell et al., Nonmedical Vaccine Exemptions and Pertussis in
California, 2010, 132 PEDIATRICS 624, 628 (2013) (“Although statewide immunization
coverage in California is high among children entering kindergarten, in many communities
within the state, coverage is far lower. Our findings are consistent with a previous study in
which [non-medical exemptions] were associated with pertussis clusters. Several studies
have previously demonstrated the increased risk of vaccine-preventable diseases among
those who refuse vaccines.”).
91 MarynMcKenna,WhyWhooping Cough Vaccines AreWearing Off, SCIENTIFIC
AM. (Oct. 1, 2013), https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/why-whooping-cough-
vaccines-are-wearing-off/#googDisableSync [https://perma.cc/43VD-4W67].
92 Nicola P. Klein et al., Waning Tdap Effectiveness in Adolescents, 137
PEDIATRICS 1, 1 (2016).
93 Annemarie Colbin, A Holistic Health Perspective, in VACCINE EPIDEMIC:
HOW CORPORATE GREED, BIASED SCIENCE, AND COERCIVE GOVERNMENT THREATEN OUR
HUMAN RIGHTS, OUR HEALTH, AND OUR CHILDREN, supra note 10, at 275, 280.
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concession that “[t]he U.S. infant mortality rate is higher than
those in most other developed countries, and the gap between the
U.S. infant mortality rate and the rates for the countries with the
lowest infant mortality appears to be widening.”94 Admittedly, the
U.S. infantmortality rate does lag far behindmost developed (and
many undeveloped) nations. The United States currently ranks
56th in the world for infant mortality rates, with an estimated 5.8
deaths per 1,000 live births.95 These figures show that the United
States is tied with Serbia and trails Bosnia and Herzegovina.96
U.S. infant mortality rates rank distressingly far behind nations
such as Germany (3.4/1000) and Japan (2.0/1000).97
In addition to these relatively poor infant mortality rates,
American adults also die earlier than adults in peer nations.98 In
fact, “[t]he U.S. ranked last in life expectancy among developed
nations through 2015 and is the only one of 18 countries with an
average life span less than 80 years.”99 These are paradoxical
outcomes, since the United States spends far more money on
health interventions per capita than any other nation.100 The
United States spends $10,224 annually per person on healthcare
while peer nations spend on average $5,280 per person.101
Statistics such as these raise suspicions related to vaccines and
pharmaceutical industry profiteering among vaccine-hesitant
individuals.102 For instance, one vaccine critic observes:
Consider, for a moment, schools’ vaccination mandates from the
drug manufacturers’ perspective. Day care and school systems become
free vaccine marketing departments. There is no need to train a sales
force or to incur other marketing expenses. If you can force your
customers to acquire your product, it eliminates all of the messy
94 MARIAN F. MACDORMAN & T.J. MATHEWS, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN
SERVS.: NAT’L CTR. FOR HEALTH STATISTICS, DATA BRIEF NO. 9, RECENT TRENDS IN INFANT
MORTALITY IN THEUNITED STATES 1 (2008), https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/databriefs/db09.pdf
[https://perma.cc/R5Z9-SKEE].
95 The World Factbook, CIA, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-
factbook/rankorder/2091rank.html [https://perma.cc/6T92-MVG4] (the United States ranks
170 out of 225 nations).
96 Id.
97 Id.




100 Bradley Sawyer & Cynthia Cox, How Does Health Spending in the U.S.




102 Michael Belkin, The Vaccine Bubble and The Pharmaceutical Industry, in
VACCINE EPIDEMIC: HOW CORPORATE GREED, BIASED SCIENCE, AND COERCIVE GOVERNMENT
THREATENOURHUMANRIGHTS,OURHEALTH,ANDOURCHILDREN, supra note 10, at 158, 169.
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uncertainty and hassle of a competitive market. Instead of free
market competition, their business strategies are built on compulsion.
The public school system is an ATM for pharmaceutical companies—
who are laughing all the way to the bank.103
Of course, evidence does not support correlating vaccine
mandates, mortality rates, and vaccine-industry profits.
However, the discrepancy between U.S. vaccine mandates and
policies in similarly situated nations, coupled with a steep
divergence in public health spending and outcomes, does perhaps
warrant closer examination to the extent that an explanation
might help allay the concerns of the vaccine-hesitant.
The government inadvertently feeds these unfounded
doubts about immunizations by consistently amending the
vaccine schedule to include more mandatory immunizations. As
one medical doctor observes, in 1983 the vaccination schedule
included twenty-four doses of seven vaccines; today, the federal
government “recommends that children receive seventy doses of
sixteen different vaccines by the time they graduate high
school.”104 During that same time period, the United States saw
its global ranking for infant mortality rates plummet.105
Vaccine critics also believe that the government
reinforces vaccine mandates through coercive fearmongering
tactics.106 Fear is indeed a strong motivator; as one public health
scholar puts it, “[p]eople will line up willingly, if not desperately,
for a vaccine if they are sufficiently frightened of the disease it
prevents.”107 To that point, critics likewise observe that
European nations estimate that measles kills between 1 in 3,000
to 1 in 4,500 infected individuals, while the United States
103 Id. at 166 (emphasis added).
104 Sherri Tenpenny, A Doctor’s View of Vaccines and the Public Health, in
VACCINE EPIDEMIC: HOW CORPORATE GREED, BIASED SCIENCE, AND COERCIVE
GOVERNMENT THREATEN OUR HUMAN RIGHTS, OUR HEALTH, AND OUR CHILDREN, supra
note 10, at 262, 262 (emphasis added).
105 Vera Hassner Sharav, Medical Ethics and Contemporary Medicine, in
VACCINE EPIDEMIC: HOW CORPORATE GREED, BIASED SCIENCE, AND COERCIVE
GOVERNMENT THREATEN OUR HUMAN RIGHTS, OUR HEALTH, AND OUR CHILDREN, supra
note 10, at 84, 94 (“If vaccines have greatly improved the health of America’s children,
then it is fair to ask why the United States’ ranking among world nations in infant
mortality has plummeted from twelfth in 1960 to twenty-ninth in 1990, down to forty-
sixth in 2010. The U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) acknowledges,
‘The U.S. infant mortality rate is higher than those in most other developed countries,
and the gap between the U.S. infant mortality rate and the rates for the countries with
the lowest infant mortality rates appears to be widening.’”).
106 See Barbara Loe Fisher, Politics, Profits & Pandemic Fear Mongering, NAT’L
VACCINE INFO. CTR. (May 1, 2009, 11:34 PM), https://www.nvic.org/NVIC-Vaccine-News/May-
2009/Friday,-May-01,-2009-Politics,-Profits—-Pandemic-.aspx [https://perma.cc/Q7JZ-MBFN].
107 Wendy E. Parmet, Pandemics, Populism and the Role of Law in the H1N1
Vaccine Campaign, 4 ST. LOUIS U. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 113, 139 (2010).
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estimates the measles kills 1 in 333 infected Americans.108 This
discrepancy stands out given the fact that there has only been
one confirmed measles death in the United States since 2003—
and that victim had been vaccinated against measles.109 As this
section demonstrates, vaccine mandates serve as a legal
foundation upon which parental doubt about vaccines continues
to grow, especially as U.S. vaccine policies and health outcomes
diverge sharply from the rest of the developed world.
II. PERCEIVEDWEAKNESSES IN REGULATING CLINICAL
VACCINE TESTS AND APPROVALS
The law governing vaccine testing and approval is the
second structure of official U.S. regulatory policy that contributes
to vaccine hesitancy. Despite extensive FDA safety protocols,
vaccine critics perceive regulatory loopholes and occasional
financial conflicts of interest as cause for concern in the vaccine
approval process. In particular, critics express concerns over
industry-sponsored clinical trials, post-market vaccine safety
analysis, and the revolving door between the FDA, CDC, and the
pharmaceutical industry.
A. Federal Vaccine Safety Regulations
The government has a large regulatory apparatus in
place to ensure that vaccines are both safe and effective.
Vaccines follow the same general path toward FDA approval as
other pharmaceutical drugs.110 Section 351 of the Public Health
Service Act and the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act (FDCA)
currently set the regulatory guidelines for vaccines.111 In
addition, the Kefauver-Harris Amendments to the FDCA
require that a vaccine producer conduct an investigation to
prove that a drug is “both safe and effective before it may be
108 See Thomsen, supra note 18, at 325.
109 TaraHaelle,First ConfirmedU.S.MeaslesDeath InMoreThanADecade, FORBES
(July 2, 2015, 3:17 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/tarahaelle/2015/07/02/first-u-s-measles-
death-in-more-than-a-decade/#228df2e9a196 [https://perma.cc/AHJ4-FX6Z]; see also CTRS. FOR
DISEASECONTROL&PREVENTION,MEASLESDATAANDSTATISTICS5 (2009), https://www.cdc.gov
/measles/downloads/measlesdataandstatsslideset.pdf [https://perma.cc/SED6-DRXR] (noting
that “the last measles death in the United States occurred in 2015”); Manisha Patel et al.,
National Update on Measles Cases and Outbreaks—United States, January 1–October 1, 2019,
CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION (Oct. 11, 2019), https://www.cdc.gov/mmwr
/volumes/68/wr/mm6840e2.htm [https://perma.cc/WL9V-UPPV] (observing that in 2019, the
United States experienced ameasles outbreak with 1,249 cases—yet no deaths were reported).
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approved for marketing.”112 Prior to conducting clinical trials, a
vaccine producer must subject a vaccine to preclinical
development and testing.113 If these tests are successful, the
vaccine producer initiates three phases of clinical trials (a fourth
phase sometimes occurs after licensing and continues to track
the vaccine for adverse reactions).114 Phase 1 involves tests on a
small group of subjects (usually fewer than 100 people) to look
for acute safety issues related to the vaccine.115 Children do not
participate in Phase 1 testing.116 Phase 2 expands the testing
(usually to several hundred people, including children) and
focuses on vaccine dose range and safety.117 Phase 3 testing
evaluates the vaccine’s safety and efficacy across a larger
population (usually 1000+ people).118
If at any point during clinical trials the “data raise
significant concerns about either safety or effectiveness, [the]
FDA may request additional information or studies, or may halt
ongoing clinical studies.”119 If the drug producer conducts a
successful clinical trial, the FDAwill approve the drug or vaccine
for sale to the public.120 The gold standard for clinical trials is to
utilize a “randomized, double-blinded, and placebo-controlled”
testing process.121 That is, the clinical trial should compare a
patient taking the experimental vaccine with a control group
that takes a placebo, and the researchers should not know which
patient receives the vaccine and which takes the placebo.122
The FDA’s Center for Biologics, Evaluation, and
Research (CBER) evaluates vaccine clinical trial data that drug
companies submit to it.123 CBER then presents that data to the
FDA’s Vaccines and Related Biological Products Advisory
112 Russel Katz, FDA: Evidentiary Standards for Drug Development and
Approval, 1 NEURORX 307, 307 (2004); see also Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act,
Pub. L. No. 75-717, § 505, 52 Stat. 1040, 1052 (1938); Drug Amendments of 1962, Pub.
L. No. 87-781, § 102(a), 76 Stat. 780, 781 (1962).
113 Larry K. Pickering & Walter A. Orenstein, Development of Pediatric Vaccine
Recommendations and Policies, 13 SEMINARSPEDIATRIC INFECTIOUSDISEASES 148, 148 (2002).
114 Investigational New Drug Application, 21 C.F.R. § 312.21(a); see also Pickering &
Orenstein, supra note 113.
115 See sources cited supra note 114.
116 See Pickering & Orenstein, supra note 113.
117 Investigational New Drug Application, 21 C.F.R. § 312.21(b); see also Pickering &
Orenstein, supra note 113.
118 Investigational New Drug Application, 21 C.F.R. § 312.21(c); see also Pickering &
Orenstein, supra note 113.
119 See Vaccine Product Approval Process, supra note 110.
120 DAVID HEALY, PHARMAGEDDON 77 (2012).
121 See Pickering & Orenstein, supra note 113.
122 Marc A. Rodwin, Independent Clinical Trials to Test Drugs: The Neglected
Reform, 6 ST. LOUIS U. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 113, 125 (2012).
123 See Pickering & Orenstein, supra note 113, at 149.
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Committee (Advisory Committee).124 The Advisory Committee
makes a vaccine-approval recommendation to the FDA
Commissioner based on considerations about the vaccine’s
safety, efficacy, and public health benefits.125 The fifteen
Advisory Committee members are typically leading authorities
in the fields of immunology, epidemiology, biochemistry, and
other areas of vaccine-related expertise.126
If the Advisory Committee recommends the vaccine and the
FDA Commissioner approves that recommendation, the CDC’s
Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices (ACIP) proceeds
to review the vaccine and makes a recommendation to the CDC
Director about whether or not to include the vaccine on the federal
vaccine schedule (Vaccine Schedule).127 ACIP considers vaccine
safety and efficacy, the severity of the disease the vaccine prevents,
and the prevalence of the disease inmaking its recommendation.128
In addition, the American Academy of Pediatrics (a professional
association of doctors) must concur with ACIP’s recommendation
before the government adds the vaccine to the Vaccine Schedule,
at which time the vaccine is effectively mandated for all U.S.
children via state laws that implement the Vaccine Schedule.129
The Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) Secretary
serves as an additional level of safety review.130 After reviewing the
various recommendations, the HHS Secretary also approves the
inclusion of a new vaccine on the Vaccine Schedule.131
The government carefully monitors vaccine safety after
doctors begin administering the vaccine to children. Public health
officials use the Vaccine Adverse Event Reporting System
124 Id.
125 Id.
126 Id.; Roster of the Vaccines and Related Biological Products Advisory Committee,
U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (Sept. 17, 2020), https://www.fda.gov/advisory-
committees/vaccines-and-related-biological-products-advisory-committee/roster-vaccines-
and-related-biological-products-advisory-committee [https://perma.cc/ZXA4-HWE5] (listing
the current committee members).
127 See Pickering & Orenstein, supra note 113, at 150.
128 Who Sets the Immunization Schedule?, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL &
PREVENTION, https://www.cdc.gov/vaccines/parents/vaccine-decision/sets-schedule.html [https://
perma.cc/B2FY-RBXZ].
129 See Pickering & Orenstein, supra note 113, at 150–54.
130 Id. at 150.
131 Id. at 149; see also CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, THE ADVISORY
COMMITTEE ON IMMUNIZATION PRACTICES (ACIP) AND THE CHILDHOOD IMMUNIZATION
SCHEDULE 2 (2018), https://www.cdc.gov/vaccines/hcp/conversations/downloads/vacsafe-acip-
color-office.pdf (“The work group presents its findings to the entire ACIP at several meetings
before ACIP members vote on whether to recommend the vaccine and who should receive the
vaccine. Once the CDC Director and DHHS have approved the ACIP recommendations, they
arepublished inCDC’sMorbidity andMortalityWeeklyReport (MMWR).Uponpublication, the
recommendations represent the official CDC recommendations for immunizations in theU.S.”).
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(VAERS) for post-market vaccine safety analysis.132 VAERS is a
national vaccine safety surveillance program cosponsored by the
FDA and CDC.133 VAERS allows “doctors and patients to file a
report if they suspect symptoms have been caused by a vaccine.”134
The FDA website states that reports of adverse vaccine reactions
“are welcome from all concerned individuals: patients, parents,
health care providers, pharmacists and vaccine manufacturers.”135
However, participation in VAERS is voluntary; the government
does not require any of these parties to use it to report adverse
reactions.136 As these extensive testing, approval, and monitoring
protocols indicate, the government takes childhood vaccine safety
very seriously.
B. Regulatory and Ethical Concerns About Federal Vaccine
Safety Regulations
Critics of the vaccine approval process (and the FDA’s
clinical trial system, more generally) believe that this multitiered
apparatus of “evidence-based medicine” is highly susceptible to
dishonesty and fraud.137 These critics identify pharmaceutical
company control over clinical trials as the primary source of
concern.138 Clinical trials are time consuming and expensive, which
some believe results in companies cheating the system to make
sure their drugs secure approval.139 Cheating is possible because
the FDA does not consider unsuccessful clinical trials in evaluating
a drug’s safety or efficacy. This means that a company can conduct
numerous failed trials before securing a successful trial needed for
approval.140 With no third-party oversight, companies can utilize
biased clinical trials, misinterpret andmisreport clinical trial data,
or engage in fraud before submitting the clinical trial results to the




134 Joanna B. Apolinsky & Jeffrey A. Van Detta, Rethinking Liability for
Vaccine Injury, 19 CORNELL J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 537, 627 (2010).
135 See Vaccine Adverse Events, supra note 132.
136 See Parasidis, supra note 13, at 2210.
137 Jerome P. Kassirer, Commercialism and Medicine: An Overview, 16
CAMBRIDGE Q. HEALTHCARE ETHICS 377, 381 (2007).
138 Drummond Rennie, When Evidence Isn’t: Trials, Drug Companies and the
FDA, 15 J. L. & POL’Y, 991, 1006–08 (2007).
139 See generally Rodwin, supra note 122 (examining the conflicts of interest
that arise in the vaccine testing and approval process as a result of industry-sponsored
clinical trials).
140 JOSEPH DUMIT, DRUGS FOR LIFE: HOW PHARMACEUTICAL COMPANIES
DEFINE OUR HEALTH 100 (2012).
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FDA.141 According to the deputy editor of the Journal of the
American Medical Association, this kind of cheating (or fraud)
happens on a routine basis.142 He describes the process through
which paid researchers send the clinical trial results to the
sponsoring drug company “who analyses the evidence, drops what
is inconvenient, and keeps it all secret . . . . If the drug seems no
good or harmful, the trial is buried and everyone reminded of their
confidentiality agreements.”143 The drug companies, which profit
from successful clinical trials, are “often the only source of
information about their drugs.”144
Companies like Merck and GlaxoSmithKline, the world’s
leading vaccine manufacturers by revenue,145 have admitted to
engaging in precisely these practices with regards to drugs such
as Vioxx and Paxil, respectively.146 In these cases, the drug
companies admitted to engaging in clinical trial fraud that
resulted in thousands of fatalities.147 In the case of Vioxx, some
researchers estimate that Merck’s clinical trial fraud may have
resulted in a staggering 60,000 U.S. fatalities, while the Paxil
141 Sergio Sismondo, Ghost Management: How Much of the Medical Literature Is
Shaped Behind the Scenes by the Pharmaceutical Industry?, 4 PLOSMED. 1429, 1429 (2007);
see alsoRodwin, supranote 122, at 114 (“Nevertheless, the conflicts of interest persist because
the firm that seeks to market a drug designs and controls the clinical trials used to test its
safety and efficacy. The FDA relies upon these trials when it evaluates whether or not to
authorize marketing the drug. An ample record reveals that drug firms can design clinical
trials inways that bias the conclusions. They can alsomisinterpret ormisreport the trial data,
or engage in fraud.”); Merck Manipulated the Science about the Drug Vioxx, UNION
CONCERNED SCIENTISTS (Oct. 12, 2017), https://www.ucsusa.org/resources/merck-manip
ulated-science-about-drug-vioxx#:~:text=Scientists%20from%20the%20pharmaceutical%20
giant,patients’%20risk%20of%20heart%20attack [https://perma.cc/RC39-8FEQ] (noting that,
in connection with its drug Vioxx, “[s]cientists from the pharmaceutical giant Merck skewed
the results of clinical trials in favor of the arthritis drug, Vioxx, to hide evidence that the drug
increased patients’ risk of heart attack,” and that “[a] Merck scientist was also found to have
removed the evidence of three heart attacks among patients in a dataset from the results
presented”); Press Release, U.S. Dept. of Justice, GlaxoSmithKline to Plead Guilty and Pay
$3 Billion to Resolve Fraud Allegations and Failure to Report Safety Data (July 2, 2012),
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/glaxosmithkline-plead-guilty-and-pay-3-billion-resolve-fraud-
allegations-and-failure-report [https://perma.cc/E782-QYYB] (“Global health care giant
GlaxoSmithKline LLC (GSK) agreed to plead guilty and to pay $3 billion to resolve its
criminal and civil liability arising from the company’s unlawful promotion of certain
prescription drugs, its failure to report certain safety data, and its civil liability for alleged
false price reporting practices, the Justice Department announced today. The resolution is
the largest health care fraud settlement in U.S. history and the largest payment ever by a
drug company.”).
142 See Rennie, supra note 138, at 1007–08.
143 Id. at 1007.
144 Id. at 1010.
145 Eric Sagonowsky, The Top 5 Vaccine Companies by 2017 Revenue, FIERCE
PHARMA (Aug. 1, 2018, 7:00 AM), https://www.fiercepharma.com/special-report/top-5-
vaccine-companies-by-2017-revenue [https://perma.cc/DM96-PDTW].
146 Eugene McCarthy, A Call to Prosecute Drug Company Fraud and Organized
Crime, 69 SYRACUSE L. REV. 439, 452–54 (2019).
147 Id.
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clinical trial fraud possibly contributed to thousands of American
adolescent suicides.148
Industry critics believe that vaccine producers regularly
engage in this same kind of clinical bias (or designing a clinical trial
to ensure positive findings) and fraud. Raw clinical trial data is
considered proprietary information, so companies do not share it
with the FDA or other third parties.149 This has led some
researchers to question drug company claims about vaccine safety.
In one instance, the Association of American Physicians and
Surgeons (AAPS) had concerns about the Hepatitis B vaccine.150
AAPS filed a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request for the
safety data that the CDC used in deciding to add the vaccine to the
Vaccine Schedule.151 The government never produced the data in
response to the FOIA request, which some critics believe indicates
that no such safety data exists and proves that Hepatitis B vaccine
researchers engaged in clinical fraud.152 Indeed, subsequent
independent third-party studies found serious safety and efficacy
concerns related to the Hepatitis B vaccine.153
Vaccine critics are also concerned about the sparse data
that companies do make available after clinical trials. The case of
Prevnar, a vaccine for pneumococcal infections (which cause
childhood earaches and pneumonia), is illustrative.154 U.S. vaccine
laws indicate that children should receive four injections of
Prevnar before the age of two.155 The vaccine producer revealed
that, after clinical trials, it could not attest to the vaccine’s
carcinogenic potential or to whether it might impair fertility, but
conceded that the vaccine may interfere with the effectiveness of
other mandated childhood vaccines.156 As to efficacy, testing
showed that Prevnar reduced a child’s chances of getting
pneumococcal disease from just 00.15 percent to 00.02 percent.157
Despite these questionable safety and efficacy outcomes, the
government approved and mandated Prevnar, which, since 2015,
148 MatthewHerper,David GrahamOn The Vioxx Verdict, FORBES (Aug. 19, 2005),
https://www.forbes.com/2005/08/19/merck-vioxx-graham_cx_mh_0819graham.html#
2b3ed9175698 [https://perma.cc/XF2J-RLDL]; David Dobbs, The Human Cost of a Misleading
Drug-Safety Study, ATLANTIC (Sept. 18, 2015), https://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/201
5/09/paxil-safety-bmj-depression-suicide/406105/ [https://perma.cc/N5UU-EVCD] (explaining
the extent and repercussions of the Paxil clinical-trial fraud).
149 Michael E. Horwin, Comment, Ensuring Safe, Effective and Necessary
Vaccines for Children, 37 CAL. W. L. REV. 321, 354 (2001).
150 See Holland, supra note 40, at 71–72.
151 Id.
152 Id.
153 Id. at 72.
154 See Horwin, supra note 149, at 342–46.
155 Id. at 343.
156 Id. at 345.
157 Id. at 346.
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generated at least $23.4 billion in revenue for Pfizer, including
nearly $6 billion in 2018.158
Some parents likewise worry about the fact that the
Vaccine Schedule calls for children to receive multiple vaccines
during a single doctor’s visit, but clinical trials do not test the
vaccine in concert with these other required immunizations.159 As
a result, some critics argue that vaccine producers are not really
testing some vaccines—or, at least, not under relevant
conditions.160
Addressing clinical and publication bias in the vaccine
industry, the British Medical Journal published a study that
found, with regard to an H1N1 vaccine, “that most registered and
completed [vaccine] trials were not published in the peer reviewed
literature within two years from the onset of the pandemic” for
which the vaccine was approved.161 The researchers noted that “a
delay in publication of relevant randomized controlled trials may
distort the available evidence that is used for recommendations,
allocation of resources, stockpiling of drugs and vaccines, and other
public action.”162 Indeed, the problem of incomplete information
related to vaccine development, and the contracts underlying that
development, has concerned some observers as the United States
rapidly seeks safe and effective COVID-19 vaccines.163
In addition to clinical bias, vaccine critics have raised
concerns about the post-market safety analyses of vaccines.
VAERS is a “passive” reporting system.164 This means “that no
active effort is made to search for, identify and collect
information, but rather information is passively received from
those who choose to voluntarily report their experience.”165 The
158 Bob Herman, A Vaccine is Pfizer’s Best-Selling Drug, AXIOS (Feb. 5, 2019),
https://www.axios.com/pfizer-vaccine-prevnar-top-selling-drug-161f7f05-c68e-4deb-
93bb-c121664b7f15.html[https://perma.cc/WBC9-VJZM].
159 Allen Tate, “TheGreater Good,” inVACCINEEPIDEMIC:HOWCORPORATEGREED,
BIASED SCIENCE, AND COERCIVE GOVERNMENT THREATEN OUR HUMAN RIGHTS, OUR
HEALTH, ANDOURCHILDREN, supra note 10, at 97, 99.
160 Id.
161 LambertoManzoli et al.,Non-Publication andDelayedPublication of Randomized
Trials on Vaccines: Survey, 348 BRITISH MED. J. 1, 2 (2014) (this study encompassed
“randomized controlled trials that evaluated the efficacy (including immunogenicity) or safety in
healthy humans of selected vaccines (HPV, H1N1, meningococcal, pneumococcal, and
rotavirus)” from a wide array of vaccine databases, but this particular quotation relates
specifically to the delayed publication of results related to anH1N1 vaccine).
162 Id. at 1.
163 Sydney Lupkin, A Federal Coronavirus Vaccine Contract Released at Last, But
Redactions Obscure Terms, NPR (Oct. 24, 2020 6:16 PM), https://www.npr.org/sect
ions/health-shots/2020/10/24/927474041/a-federal-coronavirus-vaccine-contract-released-at-
last-but-redactions-obscure-t [https://perma.cc/5XUK-YJE9].
164 Tom T. Shimabukuro et al., Safety Monitoring in the Vaccine Adverse Event
Reporting System (VAERS), 33 VACCINE 4398, 4398 (2015).
165 Id.
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government concedes that adverse vaccine reactions are
drastically underreported and that “VAERS receives reports for
only a small fraction of actual adverse events.”166 To suggest that
VAERS receives only a “small portion” of reports is probably a
gross understatement; the FDA estimates it receives only 1
percent of adverse drug reaction reports (meaning that almost
all adverse reactions go unreported).167
Setting aside the general public, it appears that even
healthcare providers do not utilize VAERS. Surveys indicate
that 26 percent of healthcare providers do not even know that
VAERS exists and 82 percent of healthcare providers who
identify an adverse event after immunization do not report it to
VAERS.168 Fueling doubts about vaccines, both scholars and
federal officials suggest that it is “not unreasonable” to conclude
that the government intentionally structured VAERS to
discourage adverse reaction reporting.169 In the 1970s, an active
tracking system exposed a spate of adverse vaccine reactions
that effectively scuttled a national swine flu vaccination
program and undermined long-term government immunization
efforts.170 Indeed, a former CDC Director stated that an accurate
tracking system would be dangerous, as widespread parental
awareness of the frequency and degree of adverse vaccine
reactions might lead to the demise of the U.S. vaccination
program altogether.171 In other words, the CDC feared that if
people knew precisely how dangerous vaccines could sometimes
be, they might not agree to immunize their healthy children.
Perhaps the most common safety concerns that critics
raise are the financial conflicts of interest that occasionally arise
between the government and the pharmaceutical industry. This
“revolving door” might be a legitimate concern, as demonstrated
by the fact that, in 2017, 66 percent of pharmaceutical industry
lobbyists were previously federal officials.172 Additionally,
industry executives play a role in making public policy with
regard to vaccines. For instance, the FDA vaccine Advisory
166 Guide to Interpreting VAERS Data, VACCINE ADVERSE EVENT REPORTING
SYS., https://vaers.hhs.gov/data/dataguide.html [https://perma.cc/8GME-5U6C].
167 STEPHEN A. GOLDMAN, FOOD & DRUG ADMIN.: MEDWATCH, THE CLINICAL
IMPACT OF ADVERSE EVENT REPORTING 5 (1996).
168 Michael M. McNeil et al., Who is Unlikely to Report Adverse Events After
Vaccinations to the Vaccine Adverse Event Reporting System (VAERS)?, 31 VACCINE
2673, 2677 (2013).
169 See Parasidis, supra note 13, at 2207.
170 See id.
171 See id.
172 Industry Profile: Pharmaceuticals/Health Products, OPENSECRETS.ORG,
https://www.opensecrets.org/lobby/indusclient_lobs.php?id=h04&year=2017
[https://perma.cc/8DML-T8GN].
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Committee currently includes Dr. Paula Annunziato (Vice
President and Therapeutic Area Head at Merck) and Dr. Gregg
Sylvester (Vice President of Medical Affairs at Seqirus Inc.), who
are executives of companies that profit from vaccine sales.173 In
2019, Merck was an industry leader in annual vaccine revenues
($7.96 billion),174 while Seqirus is “one of the world’s largest
influenza vaccine companies.”175 Dr. Paul Offit, who is considered
to be “perhaps the most widely-quoted defender of vaccine safety”
in the United States, also sits on the Advisory Committee.176 In
addition to his role in approving vaccines and recommending
them to the government, Offit develops vaccines for profit.177
Indeed, Offit developed the RotoTeq rotavirus vaccine (a
mandated vaccine), for which, according to some estimates, he
may have earned up to $45 million when Merck purchased the
royalty rights to the vaccine he developed.178 Offit has failed to
provide details to news agencies who have requested information
concerning his financial ties to Merck.179 For vaccine-hesitant
critics, the presence of drug company executives on a government
panel that approves childhood vaccines raises ethical concerns.
The revolving door between government and industry
exists at the highest levels. The CDC Director plays a
determinative role in adding vaccines to the Vaccine Schedule.180
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176 See Roster of the Vaccines and Related Biological Products Advisory Committee,
supra note 173; Sharyl Attkisson,How Independent Are Vaccine Defenders?, CBSNEWS (July
25, 2008, 6:20 PM), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/how-independent-are-vaccine-defenders/
[https://perma.cc/48HA-QC87].
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179 Corrections for April 18, ORANGE COUNTY REG. (Apr. 18, 2011, 3:49 PM),
https://www.ocregister.com/2011/04/18/corrections-for-april-18-2/ [https://perma.cc/YKC
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Julie Gerberding was CDC Director from 2002-2009.181 During
her tenure, Merck secured CDC approval of its human papilloma
virus vaccine, Gardasil.182 At the time the CDC approved Merck’s
vaccine, industry critics observed that “Gardasil [was] the most
expensive childhood vaccine for the least prevalent disease” that
the CDC had included on the Vaccine Schedule.183 After resigning
as CDC Director, Gerberding—in short order—joined Merck as
president of its vaccine division.184 Then, in 2015, Gerberding sold
38,368 Merck shares for $2.3 million.185 Brenda Fitzgerald, CDC
Director from 2017-2018, stepped down in scandal after
investigations uncovered, among other conflicts of interest, that
she likewise invested heavily in Merck stock shortly after
becoming CDC Director.186 Robert Redfield is the current CDC
Director.187 In his previous career as an Army vaccine researcher,
colleagues accused him of overstating clinical trial results related
to anHIV vaccine, which helped secure $20million in government
funding for his research unit.188 At the FDA level, “9 out of the last
10 FDA commissioners—representing nearly four decades of
agency leadership—have gone on to work for pharmaceutical
companies.”189
These conflicts of interest are not limited to the CDC and
FDA. The HHS Secretary has “unilateral authority” to add
vaccines to the Vaccine Schedule.190 The current HHS Secretary
is Alex Azar.191 Azar previously served as a top executive at Eli
181 PastCDCDirectors/Administrators, CTRS.FORDISEASECONTROL&PREVENTION,
https://www.cdc.gov/about/history/pastdirectors.htm [https://perma.cc/PR8H-8DM4].
182 See Holland, supra note 40, at 78.
183 Id.
184 Julie L.Gerberding,M.D.,M.P.H.,MERCK, https://www.merck.com/leadership/juli
e-l-gerberding-m-d-m-p-h/ [https://perma.cc/K62X-EQP4].
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DAKOTA FIN. NEWS (May 11, 2015), https://web.archive.org/web/20150528003538/http://www.
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[https://perma.cc/8LH5-NPYE].
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https://www.cnn.com/2018/01/31/health/cdc-director-fitzgerald-resigns-bn/index.html
[https://perma.cc/7U8J-FXAR].
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189 Katherine Ellen Foley, Trust Issues Deepen as yet Another FDA Commissioner
Joins the Pharmaceutical Industry, QUARTZ (July 1, 2019), https://qz.com/1656529/yet-another-
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Lily, one of the nation’s largest pharmaceutical companies.192
Critics described Azar’s appointment as HHS Secretary as the
pharmaceutical industry’s “biggest lobbying victory ever.”193
Similar financial conflicts of interest arise at the state
level with regard to implementing Vaccine Schedule mandates
for children. For instance, Texans were surprised in 2007 when
Governor Rick Perry issued an executive order “mandating the
HPV vaccine for all girls entering sixth grade, unless their
parents completed a conscientious-objection affidavit form.”194
The vaccine mandate required all adolescent females to receive
Gardasil, Merck’s aforementioned human papillomavirus
vaccine.195 This surprise turned to outrage when news surfaced
that Mike Toomey, Perry’s confidant and former chief of staff,
was now working as a Texas-based Merck lobbyist.196 Merck and
Toomey were in the “midst of a multimillion-dollar campaign to
persuade states to make the vaccine mandatory.”197 Part of
Merck’s vaccine campaign included donating “$377,000 to the
Republican Governor’s Association, which Perry chaired.”198
Perry has since stated that the HPV vaccine executive order was
a “mistake.”199
A year later, New Jersey surprised many by becoming the
first state to mandate the flu vaccine for all children in
daycare.200 The law sparked outrage among parents, but New
Jersey public health officials stood firm against the public
192 Gabriel Levitt, Alex Azar Is Big Pharma Personified. He Must Not Become US
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backlash.201 A year later, Eddy Bresnitz, New Jersey’s deputy
health commissioner who spearheaded the flu vaccine mandate
effort, followed in Gerberding’s footsteps and took a job at Merck
overseeing a vaccine unit.202 After Bresnitz helped institute the
New Jersey flu shot mandate, the New Jersey-based Merck (at
which Bresnitz then worked) secured the exclusive right to
market Afluria, one of the few FDA-approved and CDC-
recommended flu vaccines.203
The lax regulatory oversight of vaccine testing and
problematic financial conflicts of interest in the vaccine approval
process constitute the second legal structure upon which vaccine
hesitancy rests. This structure enables critics to claim that
vaccines are for-profit medical interventions that are sometimes
unnecessary and unsafe. The regulatory regime creates the
appearance of “revolving door” fraud and self-dealing. These
accusations are perhaps not entirely far-fetched, as the House of
Representatives Government Reform Committee shared similar
concerns and its investigation into vaccine testing and approval
procedures found that “conflict of interest rules employed by the
FDA and CDC have been weak, enforcement has been lax, and
committee members with substantial ties to pharmaceutical
companies have been given waivers to participate in committee
proceedings.”204 Despite the government’s unquestionable
commitment to ensuring vaccine safety, the conflicts of interest
that it permits in the testing and approval process might appear
problematic to some observers.
III. LIMITED LIABILITY OF VACCINE PRODUCERS
The third structure of U.S. law that produces vaccine
hesitancy relates to the limited liability that the government
grants drug companies related to vaccine injuries. Vaccine
critics suggest that this blanket immunity from civil liability
creates little incentive for vaccine producers to innovate and
market the safest possible vaccines. Given the compulsory
201 See Alfonsi, supra note 200.
202 See Belkin, supra note 102, at 163; see also Eddy Bresnitz, LINKEDIN,
https://www.linkedin.com/in/eddy-bresnitz [https://perma.cc/AN9R-M7LE] (showing Bresnitz’s
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Jersey Department of Health and Senior Services in June 2008 and began working at Merck
later thatmonth).
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ENGINEERING & BIOTECHNOLOGY NEWS (Sept. 28, 2009), https://www.genengne
ws.com/topics/translational-medicine/merck-co-to-market-csls-seasonal-flu-vaccine-in-the-u-s/
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204 U.S. House of Rep. Comm. on Gov’t Reform, Majority Staff Rep. on Conflicts
of Interest in Vaccine Policy Making (June 15, 2000).
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nature of vaccines, critics argue that limited liability also
transfers undue risk to the public, since the government
compels it to purchase and use vaccines yet does not permit the
public to hold vaccine producers accountable when the product
causes an injury. Indeed, the government asks vaccine injury
victims to compensate themselves through a taxpayer-funded
compensation system, which likely contributes to hesitancy
about using the product.
A. The Evolution of Vaccine-Related Limited Liability
Legislation
The government’s decision to provide limited liability to
vaccine manufacturers arose from a public health necessity. The
U.S. vaccination program was in a state of crisis during the late
1970s and early 1980s.205 During this period, adverse reactions
to the diphtheria-tetanus-pertussis (DTP) vaccine were on the
rise.206 Several lawsuits, based on new vaccine-related causes of
action, exposed drug companies to unanticipated financial
liability for alleged injuries related to these vaccines.207 This new
vaccine-related liability arose under the legal theories of the
“implied warranty of merchantability” and the “failure to warn”
of potential harm.208 As a result of these emerging causes of
action, drug companies faced an aggregate of $3.5 billion in
vaccine damage claims in 1985.209 This liability exposure
prompted insurance companies to impose higher premiums on
vaccine manufacturers, which consequently made vaccine
production less profitable.210
Manufacturers found these additional costs
“burdensome,” which led them to seek recourse and market
protection from the government.211 Some drug companies
threatened to leave the vaccine market altogether and began
205 Jaclyn Shoshana Levine, The National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program:
Can It Still Protect an Essential Technology?, 4 B.U. J. SCI. &TECH. L. 9, ¶¶ 2–3 (1998).
206 Emily Marcus Levine & Andrea Sudell Davey, The National Vaccine Injury
Compensation Program and Maternal Immunizations, 11 J. HEALTH & LIFE SCI. L. 32,
34–35 (2017).
207 See Calandrillo, supra note 7, at 407.
208 See Reyes v. Wyeth Labs., 498 F.2d 1264, 1272 (5th Cir. 1974) (holding a
vaccine producer liable for $200,000 in damages under the failure-to-warn legal theory
after the plaintiff developed polio from the polio vaccine); Gottsdanker v. Cutter Labs., 6
Cal. Rptr. 320, 322 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1960) (holding a vaccine producer liable for
approximately $147,000 in damages under the theory of breach of implied warranty after
two children contracted polio from the company’s polio vaccine).
209 See Henson, supra note 69, at 73.
210 Id. at 73–74.
211 See Levine & Davey, supra note 206, at 35.
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exerting political pressure for changes in vaccine-liability laws.212
The pharmaceutical andmedical industries “opposed any liability
for vaccine manufacturers, citing threats to the vaccine supply
and public health” as political leverage.213 Indeed, by the 1980s,
there were only four DTP vaccine producers and two polio vaccine
producers.214 The confluence of these factors produced legitimate
concern about the future of the U.S. vaccine program:
Vaccine stockpiles were at a critically low level and Congress found
that the withdrawal of even one manufacturer from the market would
likely cause nationwide vaccine shortages. Thus, Congress recognized
that the tragic injuries suffered by children, the extreme liability
exposure facing vaccine manufacturers, and the danger facing society
if any more manufacturers stopped producing vaccines all combined
to create the perfect storm.215
Pharmaceutical executives aggressively lobbied Congress
to all but eliminate tort liability for vaccine producers.216 A Merck
executive proposed that the government create a no-fault
compensation program, through which vaccine-injured children
could receive government compensation paid for through an
excise tax on vaccines.217 Other drug company executives testified
that it would be more “fiscally sound” if the government—rather
than the pharmaceutical industry—compensated vaccine-injured
children.218 Notably, Jonas Salk, who developed the first safe and
inactive polio vaccine, strongly opposed these limited liability
proposals out of fear that industry indemnification would
disincentivize future vaccine research, safety, and innovation.219
Congress eventually adopted the Merck executive’s
proposal and enacted the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act
of 1986 (Injury Act).220 The Injury Act is a no-fault vaccine injury
compensation program through which the government directly
compensates vaccine-injured children.221 The government
finances the vaccine-injury compensation program through an
excise tax (or surcharge) of seventy-five cents levied on each
212 See Levine, supra note 205, ¶ 2.
213 Mary S. Holland, Liability for Vaccine Injury: The United States, the
European Union, and the Developing World, 67 EMORY L.J. 415, 422 (2018).
214 See Henson, supra note 69, at 74.
215 Id.
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the Last Two Decades, 111 PENN ST. L. REV. 681, 693 (2007).
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220 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 300aa-1 to -34.
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vaccine purchase.222 The tax finances a trust fund that the
government uses to compensate vaccine-injury victims.223 The
program insulates drug companies from vaccine-related civil
liability in order to encourage industry participation in the
vaccine market.224 The Injury Act directly addressed the root
causes of the “vaccine crisis.” Today, it ensures that the
government has access to a stable supply of vaccines,
incentivizes companies to continue producing vaccines for the
national immunization program, and provides an efficient
mechanism for compensating vaccine-injured individuals.225
Congress designed the Injury Act to create a “less-
adversarial, expeditious, and informal proceeding for the
resolution” of vaccine-injury claims.226 Congress also believed that
the Injury Act’s market incentives would keep vaccine prices
low.227 The government’s intent was to compensate vaccine-
injured children “quickly, easily, and with certainty and
generosity.”228 The program produces a streamlined compensation
system by enabling (and requiring) petitioners to bring an
administrative claim against the government rather than to sue
a drug company in court.229 Judges and juries do not preside over
the cases brought against the government; instead, an injured
party informally presents her case to a “special master” (i.e., a
government-appointed lawyer who adjudicates vaccine claims).230
The program simplifies—and often eliminates—complex rules of
evidence and discovery to promote a user-friendly system that
does not require the training of a lawyer.231 The petitioner simply
states her case (in person, over the phone, or on video) and
submits the relevant medical records, vaccination records, or a
222 About theNational Vaccine InjuryCompensationProgram, HEALTHRESOURCES&
SERVS. ADMIN., https://www.hrsa.gov/vaccine-compensation/about/index.html [https://perma.cc/
59DF-TU6L] (“[The program is] [f]unded by a $.75 excise tax on vaccines recommended by the
Centers forDiseaseControl andPrevention for routine administration to children, the excise tax
is imposed on each dose (i.e., disease that is prevented) of a vaccine. Trivalent influenza vaccine
for example, is taxed $.75 because it prevents one disease; measles-mumps-rubella vaccine,
which prevents three diseases, is taxed $2.25.”).
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child’s death certificate and autopsy results.232 The informal rules
and expedited proceedings dictate that the special master “must
consider all relevant and reliable evidence governed by principles
of fundamental fairness to both [the petitioner and the
government].”233 The compensation program appears to favor
petitioners, since the process provides for a “swift, flexible, and
less adversarial alternative to the often costly and lengthy civil
arena of traditional tort litigation.”234
The process of filing a vaccine-injury claim under the
Injury Act begins when the injured party or their representative
files a petition with the U.S. Court of Federal Claims (the Vaccine
Court).235 The special master then decides if the petitioner can
establish by a “preponderance of the evidence” that a vaccine
caused the injury or death.236 The government maintains a
Vaccine Injury Table, which lists the “injuries, disabilities,
illnesses, conditions, and deaths” that the government anticipates
will result from vaccines and the time frame in which they
typically occur.237 If the injury appears on the Vaccine Injury
Table (i.e., if the injury was “on table”), the petitioner
automatically satisfies her burden of proof.238 The burden then
shifts to the government to refute causation between the vaccine
and the injury.239 If the injury is not listed on the Vaccine Injury
Table, the petitioner must demonstrate both that there is a valid
medical theory linking the vaccine to her injury and that the
vaccine specifically caused the injury.240 It is extremely difficult
for a claimant to meet the burden of proving causation for “off-
table” injuries.241 In essence, the Vaccine Injury Table exists to
“weed out good claims from bad.”242
232 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-11(c)(2); FED. CL. VACCINE R. 8(b)(2).
233 FED. CL. VACCINE R. 8(b)(1).
234 Vaccine Claims/Office of Special Masters, U.S. CT. FED. CLAIMS,
https://www.uscfc.uscourts.gov/vaccine-program-readmore [https://perma.cc/S7ME-MULH].
235 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-11(a)(1).
236 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-13(a)(1).
237 HEALTH RES. & SERVS. ADMIN., VACCINE INJURY TABLE 1 (2017),
https://www.hrsa.gov/sites/default/files/vaccinecompensation/vaccineinjurytable.pdf.
[https://perma.cc/CY2H-V5G4].
238 See 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-14(a); Dileo v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 23 Cl.
Ct. 796, 798 (1991). As used throughout this article, “on table” refers to injuries and
injury time frames that are listed on the government’s Vaccine Injury Table.
239 See Dileo, 23 Cl. Ct. at 798.
240 OFFICE OF SPECIAL MASTERS, GUIDELINES FOR PRACTICE UNDER THE NATIONAL
VACCINE INJURY COMPENSATION PROGRAM 44 (2019), https://www.uscfc.uscourts.gov/sites/
default/files/19.01.18%20Vaccine%20Guidelines.pdf [https://perma.cc/BGP8-NWPV]; Althen v.
Sec’y of Health &Human Servs., 418 F.3d 1274, 1278 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
241 See Apolinsky & Van Detta, supra note 134, at 577. As used throughout this
article, “off-table” refers to injuries and injury time frames that are not listed on the
government’s Vaccine Injury Table.
242 Id.
112 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 86:1
The government awards damages related to past and
future medical expenses, lost earnings, and pain and suffering.243
The Injury Act sets a compensation limit of $250,000 for both
vaccine-related deaths and pain and suffering.244 If the petition
fails, the party can seek review from the Federal Court of Claims
and the Federal Circuit.245 However, higher courts afford great
deference to the special master’s rulings and will only overturn
the decision if it was “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of
discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.”246 After
exhausting these administrative procedures, the claimant may
file a federal lawsuit against the drug company.247
However, experts agree that, practically speaking, Injury
Act petitions are the exclusive remedy available to people who
suffer vaccine injuries.248 This is because in addition to granting
the Vaccine Court original jurisdiction over all vaccine-injury
claims, the Injury Act specifically eliminates the causes of action
that might subject drug companies to liability for vaccine
injuries (as well as the aforementioned causes of action that
produced the “vaccine crisis”).249 If a vaccine producer abides by
FDA guidelines, the Injury Act also bars punitive damage
awards against manufacturers, unless they engage in fraud,
criminal activity, or intentionally and wrongfully withhold
information.250 The Injury Act likewise prohibits suits against a
vaccine producer for a failure to warn a patient about potential
vaccine harm.251 In 2011, the Supreme Court extended the Injury
Act’s limited liability protections in Bruesewitz v. Wyeth.252 In
Bruesewitz, the Court held that a vaccine producer is also
shielded from liability for vaccine design defects that may result
in injury or death.253 That is, even “if a company fails to
manufacture a vaccine using a safer, but equally effective,
243 See 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-15(a)(1)(A).
244 42 U.S.C. §§ 300aa-15(a)(2), (4).
245 42 U.S.C. §§ 300aa-12(e)–(f), -21.
246 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-12(e)(2)(B). The standard of review for the Federal Circuit is
largely the same, as noted in Whitecotton v. Sec’y of Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 81 F.3d
1099, 1104 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (“Our review of the special master’s findings of fact is very limited.
As we have recognized in the past, ‘Congress assigned to a group of specialists, the Special
Masters . . . the unenviable job of sorting through these painful cases and, based upon their
accumulated expertise in the field, judging the merits of the individual claims.’ For this reason,
Congresshas instructedus toaffirmaspecialmaster’s factual findingsunless theyarearbitrary,
capricious, or an abuse of discretion.” (alteration in original) (internal citations omitted)).
247 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-21(a)(2).
248 See Holland, supra note 213, at 424.
249 See Holland, supra note 40, at 56–58.
250 42 U.S.C. §§ 300aa-15(d),-23(d).
251 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-22(c).
252 See Bruesewitz v. Wyeth, 562U.S. 223 (2011).
253 Id. at 243.
2020] REGULATORY PRODUCTION OF VACCINE HESITANCY 113
formula, that company is nonetheless shielded from liability.”254
The Injury Act grants vaccine producers blanket immunity from
vaccine-related liability in an effort to encourage vaccine
production. This immunity protects the vaccine supply, which
ensures the nation’s public health.
B. Criticisms of Vaccine Limited Liability Legislation
Vaccine critics believe that the Injury Act belies
congressional intent and goes too far in sheltering vaccine
producers from liability.255 These critics claim that the
compensation program is neither quick, easy, certain, nor
generous for petitioners who suffer vaccine injuries.256 Some even
suggest that the Injury Act consistently produces inequitable
outcomes:
In the name of protecting children’s health, the [Injury] Act
changed the legal landscape fundamentally. Instead of keeping
doctors and the vaccine industry directly liable for adverse reactions
to vaccines, the [Injury] Act created a tax-payer financed
compensation program for injuries. Unprecedented at the time, the
[Injury] Act was, in effect, a corporate bailout for the pharmaceutical
industry, because it forced the public—rather than the industry—to
pay for damage from “unavoidably unsafe” products.257
These critics observe that the Injury Act’s limited liability
structure subverts the traditional approach to product liability,
whereby exposure to lawsuits incentivizes manufacturers to
innovate the safest possible product.258 As one critic identifies,
“[w]hat makes this law-science standoff particularly interesting
is that rather than forcing vaccine technology to bend to the law’s
demands, as has historically been the case for other inherently
dangerous medical products, Congress decided to reshape the
law” to protect drug companies.259
For some, this legal “reshaping” undermines Congress’s
stated intent behind the Injury Act. In fact, many believe that the
Injury Act produces the “antithesis” of the less-adversarial,
254 Efthimios Parasidis, Public Health Law and Institutional Vaccine
Skepticism, 41 J. HEALTH POL., POL’Y & L. 1137, 1145 (2016).
255 James B. Currier, Too Sick, Too Soon?: The Causation Burden Under the
National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program Following De Bazan v. Secretary of
Health & Human Services, 19 FED. CIR. B.J. 229, 248 (2009).
256 See Holland, supra note 213, at 425–26, 432–35.
257 Mary Holland & Robert Krakow, The Right to Legal Redress, in VACCINE
EPIDEMIC: HOW CORPORATE GREED, BIASED SCIENCE, AND COERCIVE GOVERNMENT
THREATENOURHUMANRIGHTS,OURHEALTH, ANDOURCHILDREN, supra note 10, at 42, 42.
258 See Levine, supra note 205, ¶¶ 8–9.
259 Id. ¶ 2.
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expeditious, and informal process Congress sought to create.260
Instead of a “less adversarial” process, the government routinely
uses aggressive and highly technical trial-like defenses in Vaccine
Court.261 Over the years, the government has grown increasingly
“zealous” in its refutation of vaccine-related injuries.262 For
instance, to refute on-table vaccine injuries, the government relies
on technicalities to avoid paying compensation. In Ultimo v.
Secretary of Health and Human Services, the special master
denied compensation because a child’s seizures occurred seventy-
eight hours after vaccination, which was not within the “three-
day” window that the Vaccine Injury Table dictated.263 The special
master determined that the “three-day” window was not “three
calendar days” as the petitioner argued, but rather seventy-two
hours from the precise time of vaccination.264 Such technicalities
apply only to on-table vaccine injury claims (where, recall, the
burden shifts to the government if an anticipated injury occurred
within a specific timeframe).
In contrast, off-table injuries require the petitioner to
prove both specific and general causation linking the vaccine to
the injury.265 Today, the off-table burden of proof is effectively
insurmountable.266 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit established this heavy burden in De Bazan v. Secretary
of Health & Human Services.267 After De Bazan, off-table
vaccine-injury claimants must disprove “all other possible
causes for their injuries except for the vaccine.”268 Off-table
petitioners must now prove a negative in order to recover.269
Some critics also believe that the government strategically
amends the Vaccine Injury Table to remove or redefine on-table
vaccine injuries to limit the government’s financial exposure.270
These amendments transform on-table injuries into off-table
injuries, which shifts the burden of proof and makes the Vaccine
Injury Table “more restrictive andmore difficult for vaccine injury
260 Katherine E. Strong, Note, Proving Causation Under the Vaccine Injury Act:
A New Approach for a New Day, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 426, 445–46 (2007); see also 42
U.S.C. § 300aa-12(d)(2)(A).
261 See Apolinsky & Van Detta, supra note 134, at 578–79.
262 See Parmet, supra note 107, at 134.
263 SeeUltimo v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 28 Fed. Cl. 148, 150–51 (1993).
264 Id. at 151.
265 See OFFICE OF SPECIAL MASTERS, supra note 240; see also Althen v. Sec’y of
Health & Human Servs., 418 F.3d 1274, 1278 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
266 See Apolinsky & Van Detta, supra note 134, at 577.
267 De Bazan v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 539 F.3d 1347, 1351–52 (Fed.
Cir. 2008) (holding that a plaintiff must prove “causation-in-fact” for off-table claims).
268 See Currier, supra note 255, at 231.
269 Id. at 251.
270 See Henson, supra note 69, at 92.
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victims to prevail.”271 For instance, in 1995 the government
amended the Vaccine Injury Table to remove “seizure disorder”
and to set a more restrictive encephalopathy (brain damage)
definition.272 Prior to these burden-shifting amendments, special
masters conceded one in three vaccine-injury claims; after the
amendments, they concede just one in seven claims.273 All told,
“[a]lmost four out five claimants lose in what was meant to be a
petitioner-friendly administrative forum.”274
The Injury Act has likewise proven to be slower and more
parsimonious than anticipated.275 Some observers point to
instances in which the government fails to provide quick,
certain, and generous compensation to vaccine-injured
individuals.276 Critics observe that petitioners generally have to
wait two years to receive a decision from the special master.277
They note that the proceedings are not certain because the
government sometimes threatens to appeal decisions if the
petitioner refuses to keep the findings confidential.278 This
eliminates precedential source material upon which future
petitioners might rely.279 Compensation is not generous, as the
government often denies seemingly insignificant vaccine-injury
costs.280 For instance, after a vaccine rendered an individual
wheelchair-bound, the government argued that a $150 cost for
annual “wheelchair maintenance” was excessive.281 After
another vaccine resulted in permanent incontinence, the
government challenged an annual $135 bedsheet allowance,
suggesting that rubber sheets—which can be wiped off with a
cloth—would be a cheaper alternative to washing and changing
fabric bedsheets.282 The government even disputed a $40 shoe
271 Id.
272 National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program: Revision of the Vaccine Injury
Table, 60 Fed. Reg. 7678, 7694 (Feb. 8, 1995) (codified at 42 C.F.R. § 100 (1995)); National
Vaccine Injury Compensation Program: Revisions andAdditions to the Vaccine Injury Table–
II, 62 Fed. Reg. 7685, 7688 (Feb. 20, 1997) (codified at 42 C.F.R. § 100 (1997)).
273 Myron Levin, Vaccine Injury Claims Face Grueling Fight, L.A. TIMES (Nov.
29, 2004, 12:00 AM), http://articles.latimes.com/2004/nov/29/business/fi-vaccinecourt29
[https://perma.cc/HQT3-C6S6].
274 See Holland & Krakow, supra note 257, at 43.
275 See Levin, supra note 273.
276 Id.
277 Gordon Shemin, Comment,Mercury Rising: The Omnibus Autism Proceeding
and What Families Should Know Before Rushing Out of Vaccine Court, 58 AM. U. L. REV.
459, 512 (2008).
278 See Parasidis, supra note 13, at 2159.
279 Id.
280 See Levin, supra note 273.
281 Id.
282 Id.
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expenditure for a child who had suffered “profound mental
retardation” after a state-mandated vaccine injured her.283
In another case, the government may even have
attempted to stall an administrative proceeding for eight years
in the hopes that the vaccine-injured child would die, as the one-
time $250,000 award for death was cheaper than a lifetime
annuity payment.284 The government eventually lost the case
(after the child died), but threatened to appeal unless the child’s
mother agreed to keep the decision confidential.285 The
government admits that it makes similar threats about
maintaining confidentiality to bereaved parents “on very rare
occasions.”286 Some critics likewise perceive undue frugality in
the fact that the government has not adjusted the $250,000 cap
on death allowances for inflation in the thirty years since the
Injury Act’s inception.287 Meanwhile, the taxpayer-financed
Injury Act compensation fund currently has a surplus of $4.0
billion.288 Ironically, this difficult-to-access, tax-generated
surplus is greater than the liability that drug companies faced
during the “vaccine crisis,” which prompted the Injury Act in the
first place.289 Vaccine critics and legal commentators seem to
agree that while the Injury Act has a “spotty” record with regard
to helping victims, it has been “a stupendous success in
protecting the industry.”290
Some observers claim that the Injury Act has likewise
fallen short of its stated goals of incentivizing market
participation and reducing vaccine costs. In 1985 (one year prior
to the Injury Act), there were four manufacturers that primarily
produced state-mandated vaccines.291 Today, there are still just
four companies that “dominate the [vaccine] market (Merck,
Sanofi-Pasteur, Pfizer, and GlaxoSmithKline).”292 Despite claims
to the contrary, vaccine profits remain high (and are
continuously growing) for these companies.293 Vaccines are
profitable because consumer costs for purchasing state-
283 See Parasidis, supra note 13, at 2160.
284 See Levin, supra note 273.
285 Id.
286 Id.
287 See Henson, supra note 69, at 91–92.
288 Vaccine Injury Compensation Reports, TREASURYDIRECT, https://www.treasury
direct.gov/govt/reports/tfmp/vaccomp/vaccomp.htm [https://perma.cc/B7MM-LLS3] (providing a
current accounting of compensation fund resources).
289 See discussion supra Section III.A.
290 See Levin, supra note 273 (quoting George Washington University Law
Professor Peter H. Myers).
291 See Holland, supra note 213, at 420.
292 See Parasidis, supra note 13, at 2161.
293 See Sagonowsky, supra note 145.
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mandated vaccines have risen steeply since the Injury Act took
effect.294 Prior to the Injury Act, it cost $100 to vaccinate a child;
today, it costs nearly $2,200 to vaccine each child.295 It seems
possible that the Injury Act has actually helped transform a
vaccine market that was once in “crisis” into a highly profitable
pharmaceutical industry sector.296 Financial analysts predict
that the vaccine market will reach $104.8 billion in annual
revenues by 2027, with a steep compound annual growth rate of
10.7 percent.297 GlaxoSmithKline’s vaccine unit is now the drug
company’s top growing pharmaceutical segment.298 The number
of vaccines in development has “mushroomed” in the years since
the Injury Act.299 By 2019, there were 240 new vaccines in
development.300 Add to this the 180 COVID-19 vaccines that the
global community is currently developing.301
Vaccine market growth in North America is predicated on
“the increasing investments by government organizations and
companies to promote immunization as well as develop new
vaccines.”302 In the wake of the Injury Act, these “public-private
partnerships” have certainly succeeded in promoting
immunization and developing new vaccines.303 In 1984, the
government recommended seven vaccines.304 Today, the
government recommends sixteen vaccines.305 Prior to the Injury
294 See Parasidis, supra note 13, at 2161.
295 Id.
296 Amruta Joshi, Vaccine Market Projected to Reach $77.5 billion by 2024,
PHARMA TIMES (Apr. 16, 2018), http://www.pharmatimes.com/web_exclusives/vaccine_ma
rket_projected_to_reach_$77.5_billion_by_2024_1232012 [https://perma.cc/9UB9-PU9L];
see also Sagonowsky, supra note 145 (forecasting vaccine industry profits).
297 Vaccines Market to Reach USD 104.87 Billion by 2027; Introduction of World’s
First Malaria Vaccine In Malawi to Lighten Business Possibilities, States Fortune Business




298 See Sagonowsky, supra note 145.
299 See Larson et al., supra note 64, at 527–28.
300 Michael Phan et al.,New Vaccines in the Pipeline 2019, PHARMACYTIMES (Aug.
8, 2019), https://www.pharmacytimes.com/publications/supplements/2019/August2019/new-
vaccines-in-the-pipeline-2019 [https://perma.cc/TE78-YMJR].
301 Florian Krammer, SARS-CoV-2 Vaccines in Development, 586 NATURE 516,
518 (2020).
302 Preventive Vaccines Market Trends and Analysis Research Report 2027 | Impact
of COVID-19 Pandemic, MARKETWATCH (Oct. 15, 2020, 2:33 AM), https://www.marketwat
ch.com/press-release/preventive-vaccines-market-trends-and-analysis-research-report-2027-
impact-of-covid-19-pandemic-2020-10-15 [https://perma.cc/4KGA-GN5Q] (emphasis added).
303 Mark Blaxill & Dan Olmstead, A License to Kill?, in VACCINE EPIDEMIC: HOW
CORPORATEGREED,BIASEDSCIENCE, ANDCOERCIVEGOVERNMENTTHREATENOURHUMAN
RIGHTS, OURHEALTH, ANDOURCHILDREN, supra note 10, at 175, 176–78.
304 History of the Immunization Schedule, HIST. VACCINES, https://www.historyof
vaccines.org/content/history-immunization-schedule [https://perma.cc/SJQ8-5TL3].
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Act, doctors injected twenty-four vaccine doses into children; today,
it is recommended that doctors inject children with seventy vaccine
doses.306 The Injury Act encourages the production of new vaccines,
since drug companies do not have to bear the litigation risks and
costs connected with adverse reactions.307 Additionally, drug
companies do not need to invest in vaccine advertising to persuade
people to use their product, since the government effectively
requires individuals to get vaccinated.
Critics of U.S. vaccine policy suggest that the Injury Act
was only the government’s first step in insulating the industry
from legal and financial liability for vaccine injuries. In 2002,
Congress enacted section 304 of the Homeland Security Act
(Section 304) to create a compensation system related to
smallpox vaccine injuries.308 Smallpox was eradicated in 1979,
but the Bush Administration initiated a partial mandate for the
smallpox vaccination in 2002, deeming it a prudent precaution
against potential terrorist attacks.309 Section 304 was a fault-
based compensation system that required the injured party to
prove not only that a vaccine caused the injury, but also that the
drug company had been negligent in producing it.310 In 2003,
Congress enacted the Smallpox Emergency Personnel Protection
Act (SEPPA), which barred any appellate review regarding
smallpox vaccine injuries.311 Other legislation, passed in 2005
and renewed in 2020 in the midst of the COVID-19 pandemic,
limits emergency vaccine liability to cases in which a vaccine
producer engages in “willful misconduct” that results in injury
(this may become relevant in the next few years as COVID-19
vaccines are approved and distributed).312
Vaccine producers were reluctant to develop vaccines to
be administered to pregnant mothers due to potential tort
liability for fetal injury and death.313 However, in 2016, Congress
responded to these industry concerns with the 21st Century
306 See Tenpenny, supra note 104.
307 See Parasidis, supra note 13, at 2161.
308 HomelandSecurityAct,Pub.L.No. 107-296, § 304, 116Stat. 2135, 2167–68 (2002).
309 SuzanneMalveaux,BushGets Smallpox Vaccine, CNN (Dec. 21, 2002, 10:13 PM),
http://www.cnn.com/2002/US/12/21/bush.smallpox/index.html [https://perma.cc/V4CS-EQK8].
310 See Michael Greenberger, The 800 Pound Gorilla Sleeps: The Federal
Government’s Lackadaisical Liability and Compensation Policies in the Context of Pre-
Event Vaccine Immunization Programs, 8 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL’Y 7, 18 (2005).
311 42 U.S.C. § 239a(f)(2).
312 42 U.S.C. §§ 247d-6d(a)(1), (d)(1).
313 BIOTECHNOLOGY INDUSTRY ORG., MATERNAL IMMUNIZATION CHALLENGES &
OPPORTUNITIES: PERSPECTIVE OF VACCINE DEVELOPERS & MANUFACTURERS 5 (2014),
www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/nvpo/nvac/meetings/pastmeetings/2014/bio_maternalim
munization_septnvac2014.pdf. [https://perma.cc/52SE-VMBK].
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Cures Act (Cures Act).314 The Cures Act insulates vaccine
producers from civil liability if their vaccines injure or kill a fetus
in utero.315 In doing so, the Cures Act encourages healthcare
providers to “vaccinate pregnant women” and creates
“opportunities for pregnant women to be vaccinated at higher
rates.”316 It likewise creates additional opportunities for the
pharmaceutical industry to profit free from financial and legal
liability related to vaccine injuries.
Vaccine critics believe that these liability protections go
too far.317 Vaccine proponents, however, believe they do not go
far enough. Indeed, some vaccine advocates call for imposing
financial and legal liability on vaccine-hesitant parents. These
advocates argue that vaccine-hesitant parents should be
financially liable in the event of a disease outbreak in order to
hold “antivaccine parents responsible for their decisions.”318 That
is, when a vaccine-preventable disease infects a vaccinated child
(or a child who cannot be vaccinated), the parents of those
children should be allowed to sue parents who sought legal
vaccine exemptions for their children.319 To some vaccine critics,
this call for “accountability” might strike a discordant note given
the industry’s blanket limited liability in the profitable (and
compulsory) vaccine market. As Wendy Parmet observes:
“Suspicion and doubt can grow when vaccination laws put all of
the risk on ordinary individuals and remove all of the risk from
health officials and pharmaceutical makers.”320 The
government’s seemingly counterproductive insulation of vaccine
manufacturers from normal market conditions and legal
liability is, perhaps to some observers, a curious policy choice.
As such, the government’s liability-transferring measures serve
as the third legal structure that breeds parental distrust and,
subsequently, promotes vaccine hesitancy.
314 21st Century Cures Act, Pub. L. No. 114-255, § 3093(c), 130 Stat. 1151–52
(amending provisions of the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986, codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-14(e)).
315 Id.
316 See Levine & Davey, supra note 206, at 49.
317 See Holland, supra note 213, at 421–22.
318 Tucker Levis, Note, Vaccines and the Tragedy of the Commons: An Argument
for an Alternative Liability Tort Remedy, 65 DRAKE L. REV. 1059, 1061, 1078 (2017); see
also Dorit Rubinstein Reiss, Compensating the Victims of Failure to Vaccinate: What are
the Options?, 23 CORNELL J. L & PUB. POL’Y 595, 595 (2014) (making the case for holding
vaccine-hesitant parents financially responsible in tort for outbreaks of vaccine-
preventable diseases).
319 See Reiss, supra note 318, at 595–97.
320 See Parmet, supra note 107, at 149.
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IV. THE LEGAL STRUCTURE OF DOUBT
These legal structures—compulsory immunization,
financial conflicts of interest, and limited industry liability—lay
the foundation for vaccine hesitancy. For some parents, a close
examination of U.S. vaccine legislation might produce a certain
degree of skepticism related to the nation’s immunization
policies. That is, the United States compels parents to immunize
healthy children against an ever-expanding list of diseases,
while peer nations with superior public health outcomes impose
less extensive mandates.321 Meanwhile, pharmaceutical industry
executives and others who stand to profit from these vaccine
mandates play a role in the vaccine approval process.322 These
same executives and the companies they represent enjoy blanket
immunity from lawsuits when vaccines harm American
children.323 For some parents, this confluence of factors breeds
systemic doubt about vaccines. Further, given the proven and
undeniable importance of immunization, that doubt—and the
hesitancy it produces—endangers the public health. Though
vaccines unquestionably produce more benefits than harm,
vaccine-hesitant critics point to incidents where these legal
structures converge as “proof” that the pharmaceutical industry
aims to profit at their children’s expense. Two paradigmatic
examples demonstrate this phenomenon: the 2009 H1N1 (swine
flu) pandemic and the autism omnibus proceeding.
A. The 1976 and 2009 Swine Flu Immunization Programs
The swine flu controversy begins in 1976. The threat of
pandemic influenza (flu) recurs each year with the arrival of flu
season.324 Fear about the flu is not unfounded, as estimates
suggest that the 1918 flu pandemic killed as many as 50 million
people worldwide.325 The U.S. government warns that a flu
321 See supra Part I.
322 See supra Part II.
323 See supra Part III.
324 Renae Reints, Another Flu Pandemic Is Inevitable, World Health Organization
Says, FORTUNE (Mar. 11, 2019, 3:08 PM), http://fortune.com/2019/03/11/flu-pandemic-
influenza-who/[https://perma.cc/99UE-6QYK]; see also Peter A. Patriarca & Nancy J. Cox,
Influenza Pandemic Preparedness Plan for the United States, 176 J. INFECTIOUS DISEASES
S4, S4 (1997) (predicting that another influenza pandemic is inevitable in the future).
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pandemic could kill up to 2 million Americans.326 Indeed, as the
United States grapples with the ongoing and tragic COVID-19
pandemic, contemporary Americans now fully realize the
importance of public health vigilance in pandemic
preparedness.327 Pandemic warnings circulated in 1976, and the
government took action after several Army soldiers in New
Jersey contracted the swine flu virus.328 Based on these isolated
cases, the government created a nationwide swine flu
immunization program aiming to vaccinate 95 percent of the
U.S. population.329 However, the drug companies that produced
the swine flu vaccine refused to sell it to the government unless
the government indemnified them against vaccine injuries.330 In
response, Congress passed the Swine Flu Act.331 The Swine Flu
Act was the direct legislative predecessor to the Injury Act: it
provided vaccine producers with immunity from liability and
initiated a taxpayer-funded compensation program for
injuries.332 The CDC Director in 1976 later stated that, in
hindsight, the industry demand for indemnification should have
served as a strong indication that there was “something wrong
with this vaccine.”333
As it turned out, there was something wrong with the
swine flu vaccine. Almost immediately after the government
initiated the mass-vaccination program, immunized individuals
fell sick and some died.334 The vaccine caused Guillain-Barre
syndrome at an unexpectedly high rate.335 Guillain-Barre
syndrome is a rare disorder that can cause paralysis and even
death as a result of triggering the body’s immune system to
attack the nervous system.336 The government suspended the
swine flu immunization program after ten weeks and after only
326 HOMELAND SEC. COUNCIL, NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR PANDEMIC INFLUENZA:
IMPLEMENTATION PLAN 15 (2006), https://www.cdc.gov/flu/pandemic-resources/pdf/pandemic-
influenza-implementation.pdf [https://perma.cc/3KZC-VVM4].
327 ChunHanWong,U.S. Coronavirus Cases Near 84,000 for Second Day in a Row,
WALLSTREETJ. (Oct. 25, 2020, 8:27 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-coronavirus-cases-
near-84-000-for-second-day-in-a-row-11603621961 [https://perma.cc/539L-2TSE].
328 RICHARD E. NEUSTADT & HARVEY V. FINEBERG, THE SWINE FLU AFFAIR:
DECISION-MAKINGONASLIPPERYDISEASE 5–6, 24–30 (1978).
329 See id. at 31; see alsoDavid J. Sencer & J. DonaldMillar,Reflections on the 1976
Swine Flu Vaccination Program, 12 EMERGING INFECTIOUSDISEASES 29, 29–30 (2006).
330 See Sencer & Millar, supra note 329, at 31.
331 National Swine Flu Immunization Program of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-380, 90
Stat. 1113 (1976).
332 See Greenberger, supra note 310, at 11–12.
333 See Sencer & Millar, supra note 329, at 31.
334 See Parasidis, supra note 13, at 2198–99.
335 See id.
336 Guillain-Barre Syndrome, MAYO CLINIC, https://www.mayoclinic.org/
diseases-conditions/guillain-barre-syndrome/symptoms-causes/syc-20362793
[https://perma.cc/WXJ9-KJC7].
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40 million Americans had been vaccinated.337 Officials spent
$137 million of taxpayer money to purchase the vaccine and an
additional $90 million in tax funds to compensate vaccine-
injured victims.338 No swine flu pandemic arrived in 1976.
Government estimates suggest that “[o]nly about 200 cases of
swine flu and one death were ultimately reported in the U.S.”339
The CDC determined that during the swine flu vaccine
surveillance period, Americans reported 532 serious injuries and
58 fatalities.340 As a result of the swine flu “debacle,” the nation’s
public health suffered (and continues to suffer), because
[s]ome of the American public’s hesitance to embrace vaccines—
the flu vaccine in particular—can be attributed to the long-lasting
effects of a failed 1976 political campaign to mass-vaccinate the public
against a strain of the swine flu virus. This government-led campaign
was widely viewed as a debacle and put an irreparable dent in future
public health initiatives, as well as negatively influenced the public’s
perception of both the flu and the flu shot in this country.341
The confluence of government mandates, adverse side
effects from an unsafe vaccine, and blanket immunity from
liability for vaccine manufacturers produced cynicism among the
public and planted the seeds of widespread doubts about
vaccines. That said, the 1976 swine flu vaccination program
taught the government an important lesson about pandemic
preparedness.342 Congress passed the Public Readiness and
Emergency Preparedness Act (PREPA) in 2005.343 PREPA allows
the HHS Secretary, if she perceives a credible risk, to
unilaterally declare a disease-related “public health
emergency.”344 Once the HHS Secretary declares an emergency,
the PREPA declaration insulates covered vaccine producers
337 Shari Roan, Swine Flu ‘Debacle’ of 1976 is Recalled, L.A. TIMES (Apr. 27, 2009,
12:00 AM), https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-2009-apr-27-sci-swine-history27-
story.html [https://perma.cc/6DKG-ZDEK] (observing that “[w]aiting in long lines at schools
and clinics, more than 40 million Americans—almost 25% of the population—received the
swine flu vaccine before the program was halted in December after 10 weeks”).
338 See Parasidis, supra note 13, at 2199 (observing that “[b]y April 1985,
compensation judgments and awards totaled approximately $90 million, which nearly
matched the $ 100 million that the government had earmarked for purchase of the
vaccine itself”); see also Sencer & Millar, supra note 329, at 32 (“The direct cost of the
1976 program was $137 million.”).
339 See Roan, supra note 337.
340 Arnold W. Reitze, Jr., Federal Compensation for Vaccination Induced
Injuries, 13 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 169, 183–84 (1986).
341 Rebecca Kreston, The Public Health Legacy of the 1976 Swine Flu Outbreak,
Discover (Sept. 30, 2013, 9:30 AM), http://blogs.discovermagazine.com/bodyhorrors/2013/09/30/
public-health-legacy-1976-swine-flu/#.XJ0jK5hKi72 [https://perma.cc/B445-9GEN].
342 See Parmet, supra note 107, at 132.
343 Id. at 136; 42 U.S.C. § 247d-6d.
344 42 U.S.C. § 247d-6d(b)(1).
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from civil liability (barring “willful misconduct”) for vaccine-
related injuries.345 In addition, the declaration of a “public health
emergency” permits HHS to issue an “emergency use
authorization,” empowering the government to purchase and
administer unlicensed vaccines and drugs.346 PREPA was in
place to address the nation’s next swine flu pandemic, which
arrived in 2009.
On June 11, 2009, shortly after the first cases of H1N1
were identified in the United States, HHS Secretary Kathleen
Sebelius issued a PREPA declaration stating that the swine flu
outbreak constituted a “public health emergency.”347 After the
PREPA declaration, the government spent $6.15 billion to combat
the pandemic.348 Of those expenditures, $1.72 billion went toward
“vaccines, adjuvants, and ancillary supplies” and the
“government bought 190 million doses of pandemic vaccine from
five manufacturers.”349 The government spent an additional $1.3
billion on antiviral drugs, including Tamiflu.350 The accompanying
“emergency use authorization” allowed the government to
administer the vaccines and Tamiflu for uses and to individuals
for which and whom the FDA had not approved them.351
Investigations later revealed that Tamiflu is mostly ineffective at
treating the flu and may in fact cause fatal heart attacks.352
Tamiflu researchers had engaged in clinical bias that ignored
failed drug trials, and the company then paid a “ghostwriter” to
draft and publish medical journal articles with a company-
controlled message to establish the drug’s safety and efficacy.353
345 42 U.S.C. §§ 247d-6d(a)(1), (d)(1).
346 21 U.S.C. § 360bbb-3a(d)–(e); see also Parmet, supra note 107, at 120–22
(explaining the nature and extent of “Emergency Use Authorizations” under PREPA).
347 Pandemic InfluenzaAntivirals—Amendment, 74Fed.Reg. 29213, 29213–14 (June
19, 2009) (amendment pursuant to Public Health Services Act § 319F-3 (42 U.S.C. § 247d-6d)).
348 Robert Roos, GAO Details Spending On, Lessons From 2009 Pandemic, CTR.




350 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-11-632, INFLUENZA PANDEMIC:
LESSONS FROMTHEH1N1PANDEMIC SHOULDBE INCORPORATED INTOFUTUREPLANNING
7 (2011), https://www.gao.gov/new.items/d11632.pdf [https://perma.cc/D756-PB5Z].
351 Susan E. Sherman et al., Emergency Use Authority and 2009 H1N1 Influenza, 7
BIOSECURITY&BIOTERRORISM: BIODEFENSESTRATEGY, PRAC., &SCI. 245, 249 (2009).
352 Shannon Brownlee & Jeanne Lenzer,The Truth About Tamiflu, ATLANTIC (Dec.
2009), https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2009/12/the-truth-about-
tamiflu/307801/ [https://perma.cc/P8VT-4NQE]; see also Tom Jefferson et al.,Neuraminidase
Inhibitors for Preventing and Treating Influenza in Healthy Adults: Systematic Review and
Meta-Analysis, 339 BRIT. MED. J. 1, 1 (2009) (“Neuraminidase inhibitors have modest
effectiveness against the symptoms of influenza in otherwise healthy adults. The drugs are
effective postexposure against laboratory confirmed influenza, but this is a small component
of influenza-like illness, so for this outcome neuraminidase inhibitors are not effective.”).
353 See Brownlee & Lenzer, supra note 352.
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Despite industry claims about Tamiflu’s effectiveness, the FDA
required the manufacturer to disclose that “Tamiflu has not been
proven to have a positive impact on the potential consequences
(such as hospitalizations, mortality, or economic impact) of
seasonal, avian, or pandemic influenza.”354
Critics of the government’s response also grew suspicious
over perceived financial conflicts of interest between the
government and industry with regard to Tamiflu. Gilead
Sciences, Inc. developed Tamiflu and licenses it to Roche
Pharmaceuticals for a 10 percent royalty.355 Former Secretary of
Defense Donald Rumsfeld was previously chairman of Gilead,
and held between $5 and $25 million in Gilead stock when the
government began to stockpile the drug in preparation for a
pandemic.356 Other individuals with government ties (including
former Secretary of State George Shultz) sat on the Gilead board
of directors, some of whom earned millions of dollars from Gilead
stock—a stock price that rose approximately 50 percent in the
wake of government Tamiflu purchases.357
U.S. government entities continued implementing an
aggressive approach to the swine flu “public health emergency.”
New York State mandated the swine flu vaccine for certain
populations, including healthcare workers.358 New York issued
its mandate before the vaccine was approved, a decision which
“was met with fear and anger by health care workers, many of
whom resented the state’s imposition on their liberty and feared
the not-yet-licensed vaccine.”359 Similar to the 1976 pandemic,
the 2009 swine flu pandemic never fully materialized. In fact,
the seasonal flu proved more dangerous than swine flu that
year—and 2009 was a mild flu season.360 Americans reported
11,209 adverse swine flu vaccine reactions and fifty-six deaths
to the government’s VAERS database.361 However, since these
individuals received the vaccine under a PREPA “public health
emergency” declaration, those victims could not utilize the
354 Shannon Brownlee & Jeanne Lenzer, Does the Vaccine Matter?, ATLANTIC (Nov.
2009), https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2009/11/does-the-vaccine-matter/307723/
[https://perma.cc/86UG-W8ZA].
355 Nelson D. Schwartz, Rumsfeld’s Growing Stake in Tamiflu: Defense Secretary,
Ex-Chairman of Flu Treatment Rights Holder, Sees Portfolio Value Growing, CNN (Oct. 31,




358 N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 10, § 66-3 (expired Nov. 10, 2009).
359 See Parmet, supra note 107, at 141–42.
360 Id. at 119.
361 Id. at 123 (observing that “[f]ifty-six deaths were reported and were being
investigated, but preliminary findings did not ‘suggest’ any association with the vaccine”).
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Injury Act’s no-fault compensation program and therefore had
no immediate recourse against the government or industry.362
The government’s legal response to the 2009 swine flu
pandemic may have proven as destructive to U.S. public health
as its misguided 1976 response. The confluence of compulsion (or
fear-based coercion), financial conflicts of interest, and limited
liability again reinforced widespread vaccine doubt. Indeed, the
government’s legal response
during the 2009 outbreak may have reaffirmed populist suspicions
about the intentions of government, public health officials, and
vaccine makers. At the least, the laws fit comfortably within the
populist, antigovernment narrative, thereby providing, however
unintentionally, support for suspicions about the actions of health
officials and the safety of vaccines.363
The legal framework and the government’s response to
the swine flu pandemics in both 1976 and 2009 have
undoubtedly contributed to the rise of vaccine hesitancy in the
United States. The swine flu pandemics also demonstrate how
misguided vaccine legislation instills widespread and lasting
public doubt about immunizations. Indeed, a majority of
Americans still forgo the flu shot each year.364 In addition, these
government missteps may help explain why polls indicated that
44 percent of Americans will decline a COVID-19 vaccine,
despite living in the midst of a deadly global pandemic.365
B. The Autism Omnibus Proceeding
The autism omnibus proceeding has played an even more
significant role in the regulatory production of vaccine
hesitancy. Autism diagnoses are on the rise in the United
States.366 In 1989, doctors diagnosed 1 in 2500 children with
autism; in 2014, 1 in 68 children were diagnosed with autism.367
362 Robert Roos, HHS Preparing to Handle Claims of Harm From H1N1 Vaccine,
CTR. FOR INFECTIOUS DISEASE RES. & POL’Y (Mar. 12, 2010), http://www.cid
rap.umn.edu/news-perspective/2010/03/hhs-preparing-handle-claims-harm-h1n1-vaccine
[https://perma.cc/R97W-F9MK].
363 See Parmet, supra note 107, at 144.
364 Rachel Bergman,CDC: Fewer thanHalf of AmericansGet Flu Vaccine, NATION’S
HEALTH (Dec. 2017), http://thenationshealth.aphapublications.org/content/47/9/E45 [https://
perma.cc/KE89-8RN6].
365 See Santhanam, supra note 16.
366 Data & Statistics on Autism Spectrum Disorder, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL &
PREVENTION, https://www.cdc.gov/ncbddd/autism/data.html [https://perma.cc/BRN5-ZMMG].
367 Claire Laurier Decoteau & Kelly Underman, Adjudicating Non-Knowledge in
the Omnibus Autism Proceedings, 45 SOC. STUD. SCI. 471, 471–72 (2015); see also Data &
Statistics on Autism SpectrumDisorder, supra note 366 (concluding that in 2016 “[a]bout 1 in
54 children has been identified with autism spectrum disorder (ASD) according to estimates
from CDC’s Autism and Developmental Disabilities Monitoring (ADDM) Network”).
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Some doctors claimed that vaccines caused neurological
complications as early as the 1970s, but the perceived vaccine-
autism “link” emerged in the late 1990s.368 In 1998, Andrew
Wakefield and other researchers at the British Royal Free
Hospital published a (now discredited) study in the Lancet
medical journal, suggesting a possible link between autism and
the combined measles, mumps, and rubella (MMR) vaccine.369
Twelve years later (but after unfounded fear of the MMR vaccine
insinuated itself across the globe) the Lancet retracted the
article, concluding that Wakefield had engaged in clinical bias
and had a financial conflict of interest (a potential third-party
beneficiary funded the MMR study).370 Moreover, citing
additional ethics violations, Britain’s General Medical Council
subsequently revokedWakefield’s license to practice medicine.371
Public health advocates observe that individuals who
continue promoting the debunked vaccine-autism link confuse a
“coincidental temporal relationship” between vaccination and
childhood autism.372 People who associate autism with vaccines,
they say, fall prey to the logical fallacy of “post hoc ergo propter
hoc” (“after this, therefore because of this”).373 A brief statistical
explanation of this phenomenon is illuminating. The law
endorses that nearly all 74 million U.S. children should receive
the MMR vaccine at 12–15 months of age.374 Some of these 74
million children will inevitably get sick (unrelated to vaccines)
368 SeeHenson, supra note 69, at 67; Donna Hilts, TV Report On Vaccine Stirs Bitter
Controversy, WASH. POST (Apr. 28, 1982), https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/local/198
2/04/28/tv-report-on-vaccine-stirs-bitter-controversy/80d1fc8a-1012-4732-a517-7976c86ab52d/
[https://perma.cc/X3R3-3RE5] (reporting on the national outcry in response to a “television
report on the dangers of the whooping cough vaccine”); A. J. Wakefield et al., Ileal-Lymphoid-
Nodular Hyperplasia,Non-Specific Colitis, and Pervasive Developmental Disorder in Children,
351 LANCET637, 637 (1998).
369 SeeWakefield et al., supra note 368.
370 Laura Eggertson, Lancet Retracts 12-Year-Old Article Linking Autism to
MMR Vaccines, 182 CANADIAN MED. ASS’N J. E199, E199 (2010).
371 Jim Edwards, Autism Doctor Loses His Medical License; Now Let’s Talk
About How False Vaccine Beliefs Hurt Kids, CBS NEWS (May 24, 2010, 12:45 PM),
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/autism-doctor-loses-his-medical-license-now-lets-talk-
about-how-false-vaccine-beliefs-hurt-kids/ [https://perma.cc/2H5M-Z62W].
372 See Salmon et al., supra note 9.
373 Id. (emphasis added).
374 Id.; The Majority of Children Live With Two Parents, Census Bureau
Reports, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (Nov. 17, 2016), https://www.census.gov/newsroom/press-
releases/2016/cb16-192.html [https://perma.cc/GT9F-U4J2] (The U.S. Census Bureau
estimated that “[t]he majority of America’s 73.7 million children under age 18 live in
families with two parents (69 percent)”); Measles, Mumps, and Rubella (MMR)
Vaccination: What Everyone Should Know, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL &PREVENTION,
https://www.cdc.gov/vaccines/vpd/mmr/public/index.html [https://perma.cc/ZZ3K-2VPP]
(“[The] CDC recommends all children get two doses of MMR (measles-mumps-rubella)
vaccine, starting with the first dose at 12 through 15 months of age, and the second dose
at 4 through 6 years of age. Children can receive the second dose earlier as long as it is
at least 28 days after the first dose.”).
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between 12–15 months of age. Of those children who get sick,
some will—by the law of averages—get sick subsequently (but
coincidentally) after vaccination. The fact that autism often
emerges in children at 12–18 months of age only heightens the
danger that people will succumb to the logical fallacy that
vaccines cause autism.375 As scholars have noted:
“Unfortunately, illnesses or medical conditions of uncertain
etiology unrelated to vaccines will certainly be experienced by
some subset of children within the first two years of life. It is
problematic to assume an event is caused by a vaccine based on
a temporal connection alone.”376 Echoing this conclusion, public
health advocates confirm that “there is absolutely no support”
for the vaccine-autism link, which has “been thoroughly
debunked by the scientific community.”377 So why, then, do
claims about the vaccine-autism link continue to circulate?
Several legal anomalies related to thimerosal (a vaccine
additive) unfortunately perpetuated the unfounded vaccine-
autism nexus claims that Wakefield falsely initiated in 1998.378
Thimerosal is a mercury-based preservative added to some
vaccines to prevent bacterial growth during storage.379 The
government has repeatedly assured the public that thimerosal
is safe.380 Despite these government assurances, the CDC and
American Pediatrics Association recommended in 1999 that
manufacturers stop adding thimerosal to childhood vaccines.381
In their joint statement, they advised the public that
375 See When Do Children Usually Show Symptoms of Autism?, NAT’L INST. CHILD
HEALTH&HUM.DEV., https://www.nichd.nih.gov/health/topics/autism/conditioninfo/symptoms-
appear [https://perma.cc/FCS6-ATJ6].
376 See Reiss & Weithorn, supra note 25, at 939.
377 Id. at 891; see also Autism and Vaccines, AUTISM SCI. FOUND.,
https://autismsciencefoundation.org/what-is-autism/autism-and-vaccines/
[https://perma.cc/86D3-JLV5] (“A decade ago most researchers agreed that we needed to
study vaccines in relation to autism. We had to reconcile the fact that the number of
vaccines children were receiving was increasing, and at the same time, the number of
children who were being diagnosed with autism also was on the rise. Fortunately this was
a question that could be studied—and answered—by science. We looked at children who
received vaccines and those who didn’t, or who received them on a different, slower
schedule. There was no difference in their neurological outcomes. Multiple studies have
been completed which investigated the measles, mumps and rubella vaccination in relation
to autism. Researchers have also studied thimerosal, a mercury-based preservative, to see
if it had any relation to autism. The results of studies are very clear; the data show no
relationship between vaccines and autism.”).
378 See Autism and Vaccines, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION,
https://www.cdc.gov/vaccinesafety/concerns/autism.html [https://perma.cc/7633-968C].
379 Thimerosal and Vaccines, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, https://
www.cdc.gov/vaccinesafety/concerns/thimerosal/index.html [https://perma.cc/3BV6-GZWQ].
380 Id.
381 Notice to Readers: Thimerosal in Vaccines: A Joint Statement of the American
Academy of Pediatrics and the Public Health Service, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL &
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[o]n the one hand, there is the known serious risk of diseases and
deaths caused by failure to immunize our infants against vaccine-
preventable infectious diseases; on the other, there is the unknown
and probablymuch smaller risk, if any, of neurodevelopmental effects
posed by exposure to thimerosal. The large risks of not vaccinating
children far outweigh the unknown and probably much smaller risk,
if any, of cumulative exposure to thimerosal-containing vaccines over
the first 6 months of life.382
The perhaps too carefully worded statement only
heightened the public’s concerns about the vaccine-autism
link.383 Families began filing suit in state and federal courts
alleging that thimerosal caused their children to develop
autism.384 Parents could sue in court (as opposed to Vaccine
Court) because thimerosal was not a vaccine, but rather a
preservative drug companies added to vaccines.385 Eli Lilly is the
sole producer of thimerosal.386 As such, lawmakers did not ease
suspicions when they inserted the now-infamous Eli Lilly rider
in the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (Security Act).387 During a
holiday weekend, a still-unknown individual inserted language
in the Security Act that barred any thimerosal lawsuits in state
or federal courts.388 The amendments required that individuals
file all thimerosal claims (even though the preservative was
distinct from the vaccine) through the Injury Act’s taxpayer-
funded compensation program.389 The amendments would
“result in the dismissal of thousands of cases filed by parents
who contend that mercury in thimerosal has poisoned their
PREVENTION (July 9, 1999), https://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/mm4826a3.htm
[https://perma.cc/2C6F-B5XP].
382 Id. (emphasis added).
383 See Larson et al., supra note 64, at 528.
384 Mary Holland et al., Unanswered Questions from the Vaccine Injury
Compensation Program: A Review of Compensated Cases of Vaccine-Induced Brain
Injury, 28 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 480, 496 (2011).
385 See Currier, supra note 255, at 236.
386 Sheryl Gay Stolberg, A Capitol Hill Mystery: Who Aided Drug Maker?, N.Y.
TIMES (Nov. 29, 2002), https://www.nytimes.com/2002/11/29/us/a-capitol-hill-mystery-
who-aided-drug-maker.html [https://perma.cc/MK23-LMC5].
387 Id.; see also Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, §§ 1714–
15, 116 Stat. 2135, 2320 (2002) (amending the definition of vaccine “Manufacturer” and
“Vaccine-Related Injury of Death” for purposes of the Injury Act).
388 Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, §§ 1714–15, 116 Stat.
2135, 2320 (2002) (“42 U.S.C. [§] 300aa-33(3) is amended—(1) in the first sentence, by
striking ‘under its label any vaccine set forth in the Vaccine Injury Table’ and inserting
‘any vaccine set forth in the Vaccine Injury table, including any component or ingredient of
any such vaccine’; and (2) in the second sentence, by inserting ‘including any component or
ingredient of any such vaccine’ before the period . . . .42 U.S.C. [§] 300aa-33(5) is amended
by adding at the end the following: ‘For purposes of the preceding sentence, an adulterant
or contaminant shall not include any component or ingredient listed in a vaccine’s product
license application or product label.’”).
389 See Stolberg, supra note 386.
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children, causing autism and other neurological ailments.”390 Eli
Lilly, cynics observe, contributed $1.6 million to political
campaigns during the 2002 election cycle, more than any other
pharmaceutical company.391 As theNew York Times reported, Eli
Lilly also had close ties to the Bush Administration in 2002.392
President George H. W. Bush previously sat on the Eli Lilly
board of directors, the White House budget director was a former
Eli Lilly executive, and President Bush had recently appointed
Eli Lilly’s chief executive to serve on his presidential advisory
council.393 When asked for comment about the rider’s sudden
appearance in the Security Act, an Eli Lilly spokesperson
responded that “[i]t’s a mystery to us how it got in there.”394 The
rider’s appearance was not a mystery to vaccine critics, who
simply saw another reason to doubt vaccine safety and to be
suspicious about government claims regarding U.S. vaccine
policy more generally.
The Vaccine Court simultaneously moved to reinforce the
Eli Lilly rider in its decision Leroy v. HHS.395 The special master
in Leroy determined that the preservative thimerosal was now a
part of the vaccine, meaning that the Injury Act preempted all
thimerosal suits and that the government would use tax funds to
compensate thimerosal-related injuries.396 Also in 2002, the
Justice Department ordered the Vaccine Court to immediately
seal all records related to thimerosal’s potential role in autism-
related cases.397 Cynical observers believed that the “government
was trying to prevent families from obtaining damaging
information about the preservative, which could later be used
against drug companies” in pending lawsuits.398 At the same time,
and in a still singular departure from Vaccine Court procedure,
the government filed Autism General Order #1, which






395 See generally Leroy v. Sec’y of the Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., No. 02–
392V, 2002 WL 31730680 (Fed. Cl. Oct. 11, 2002).
396 Id. at *3, *17.
397 Bartholomew C. Wacek, Comment, Taking Sides in the Vaccine/Autism Legal
Battle, 8 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 305, 320–21 (2004); see also Sheryl Gay Stolberg,
Justice Dept. Seeks to Seal Vaccine Papers, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 27, 2002),
https://www.nytimes.com/2002/11/27/us/justice-dept-seeks-to-seal-vaccine-papers.html
[https://perma.cc/HY7F-XTDW] (“The Bush administration asked a federal claims court
today to seal documents relating to hundreds of claims that a mercury-based preservative
in vaccines, thimerosal, has caused autism and other neurological disorders in children.”).
398 See Stolberg, supra note 386.
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proceeding.399 The Autism Omnibus Proceeding (AOP) designated
six test cases that would resolve the nearly 5,600 Injury Act
petitions in which parents claimed that the MMR vaccine (and
thimerosal) caused autism in their children.400 The six cases
tested two biological theories: 1) that the MMR vaccine (coupled
with thimerosal) manifested as autism, and 2) that the MMR
vaccine alone resulted in autism.401
In all six test cases, the special master found no causal link
between the MMR vaccine, thimerosal, and autism.402 The
government awarded no compensation and appeared finally to put
the spurious vaccine-autism correlation theory to rest.403 However,
news soon leaked that the government had surreptitiously settled
one of the slated test cases.404 In the settlement and subsequent
court filings, the government conceded that the MMR vaccine
caused encephalopathy (brain damage) in a child, which
“eventually manifested as a chronic encephalopathy with features
of autism spectrum disorder.”405 The special master awarded the
family over $1.5 million in damages.406 When pressed about the
leaked settlement, the government responded that
[t]he government has never compensated, nor has it ever been
ordered to compensate, any case based on a determination that autism
was actually caused by vaccines. We have compensated cases in which
children exhibited an encephalopathy, or general brain disease.
Encephalopathy may be accompanied by a medical progression of an
array of symptoms including autistic behavior, autism, or seizures.
Some children who have been compensated for vaccine injuries may
have shown signs of autism before the decision to compensate, or may
399 See In re Claims for Vaccine Injuries Resulting in Autism SpectrumDisorder
or a Similar Neurodevelopmental Disorder, 2002 WL 31696785, at *3 (Fed. Cl. July 3,
2002) (Autism General Order #1).
400 See Decoteau & Underman, supra note 367, at 471–72, 481–82.
401 See Jennifer Keelan & Kumanan Wilson, Balancing Vaccine Science and
National Policy Objectives: Lessons From the National Vaccine Injury Compensation
Program Omnibus Autism Proceedings, 101 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 2016, 2017 (2011) (“The
cases fell into 3 broad biological theories: (1) the combination of themeasles-mumps-rubella
vaccine and an ethylmercury preservative, thimerosal, was responsible for neurologic
damage in infancy and early childhood, manifested as autism; (2) thimerosal alone was
responsible for the development of autism; and (3) the measles-mumps-rubella vaccine was
solely responsible for autism. The petitioners agreed to identify 3 test cases for each of these
hypotheses, although they subsequently dropped the third hypothesis because most of the
evidentiary material addressing it would be covered in the first set of test cases.”).
402 See Decoteau & Underman, supra note 367, at 471.
403 Id.
404 See Holland et al., supra note 384, at 500.
405 Poling ex rel. Poling v. Sec’y of Health and Human Servs., No. 02–1466V, 2011
WL 678559, at *1 (Fed. Cl. Jan. 28, 2011); see also Holland et al., supra note 384, at 500
(explaining the details of the leaked Poling family settlement with the government).
406 See Holland et al., supra note 384, at 500–01.
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ultimately end up with autism or autistic symptoms, but we do not
track cases on this basis.407
The government later admitted that the MMR vaccine
“resulted” in the child’s autism, but did not “cause” it.408 Media
reports following the leaked settlement declared that “there’s no
denying that the court’s decision to award damages to the Poling
family puts a chink—a question mark—in what had been an
unqualified defense of vaccine safety with regard to autism.”409
For the vaccine-hesitant, the leaked settlement and the
government’s qualified response only fed fears about the
unfounded vaccine-autism link.410 Indeed, for many vaccine
critics, the vaccine-autism link is not “debunked.” Legal
researchers have identified eighty-three other Vaccine Court
decisions in which special masters awarded damages in vaccine-
related autism claims under the Injury Act.411 Vaccine critics note
that there are also “approximately sixty [published scientific]
studies that support the autism-vaccine causation theory.”412 For
these vaccine critics, this evidence “calls into question” the
government’s assertions on the topic of vaccine safety.413 In any
event, the swine flu immunization programs and the AOP
demonstrate how three legal structures (legal compulsion,
conflicts of interest in vaccine testing and approval, and limited
liability for drug companies) lay the foundation for widespread
and dangerous vaccine hesitancy in the United States.
V. PROPOSED SOLUTIONS TO THE VACCINE HESITANCY
PHENOMENON
The Journal of Law, Medicine, and Ethics recently
published an article that advocated for the public to begin shaming
vaccine-hesitant parents.414 The authors highlighted media
407 Id. at 502.
408 Sharyl Attkisson, Family to Receive $1.5M+ in First-Ever Vaccine-Autism Court
Award, CBS NEWS (Sept. 10, 2010, 10:44 AM), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/family-to-
receive-15m-plus-in-first-ever-vaccine-autism-court-award/ [https://perma.cc/ZY7J-SUF3].
409 Claudia Wallis, Case Study: Autism and Vaccines, TIME (Mar. 10, 2008), http://
content.time.com/time/health/article/0,8599,1721109,00.html [https://perma.cc/PQ3M-RZCQ].
410 Jennifer Keelan & Kumanan Wilson, Balancing Vaccine Science and National
Policy Objectives: Lessons from the National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program Omnibus
AutismProceedings, 101AM.J.OFPUB.HEALTH2016, 2019 (2011) (“After thePoling concession,
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headlines that declared “stupid parents are driving the vaccination
crisis” and “[a]nti-vaxxers are stupid and contagious.”415 They
suggested that “shaming vaccine-refusing parents by attaching a
negative social meaning to their choice to refuse vaccines might
influence vaccine-hesitant parents who are on the fence.”416 This
article attempts to dissuade these kinds of solutions. Vaccine-
hesitant parents are not “stupid,” but instead tend to be among the
most highly educated, financially secure, and experienced
caregivers in the United States.417 In fact, the vaccine-hesitant
constitute a majority of American parents.418 The perils of vaccine
hesitancy are today more pronounced than ever before, as polling
suggests that more than 40 percent of Americans would be
unwilling to take a COVID-19 vaccine.419 Many of these individuals
unfortunately question whether factors beyond science and health
may have contributed to some U.S. vaccine policy decisions.420
As this article demonstrates, vaccines are not the source of
vaccine hesitancy—indeed, vaccines are among the great
achievements of modern medicine.421 Instead, the public health
crisis of vaccine hesitancy exists because U.S. vaccine policy
employs three legal structures that lay the foundations for doubt,
distrust, and even accusations of government-industry collusion.
While other developed nations do mandate some vaccines, the
strictness and breadth of compulsory vaccination laws in the
United States are unique. Meanwhile, America’s public health
outcomes trail peer nations that impose less stringent vaccine
mandates. The government-sanctioned revolving door and the
financial conflicts of interest it produces undermines vaccine
testing and approval procedures. And, the blanket immunity from
liability that the government affords vaccine producers creates
the appearance of industry protectionism. Together, these legal
structures produce vaccine hesitancy. To improve public
confidence in U.S. vaccine policy and help reduce vaccine
hesitancy, the government should consider amending (or
eliminating) one or more of these three legal structures.
First, the government could simply terminate
compulsory vaccine mandates. Global comparisons demonstrate
that vaccine mandates are not necessary to produce excellent
public health outcomes in developed nations. The nation’s social
415 Id. at 572.
416 Id. at 571 (emphasis omitted).
417 See sources cited supra note 14.
418 See Habakus & Holland, supra note 10.
419 See Santhanam, supra note 16.
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fabric and U.S. public health will not disintegrate if the
government reconsiders its policy. Great Britain, Germany,
Australia, and other developed democratic nations that employ
mostly voluntary vaccine policies boast superior public health
outcomes compared to the United States.422
Alternatively, the government could simply begin
enforcing the financial conflict of interest laws that are already
on the books.423 The law prohibits federal employees from acting
on a matter in which they have a substantial financial conflict of
interest.424 However, the law allows agencies to grant waivers to
conflicted employees.425 Granting waivers to individuals who
stand to profit from vaccine mandates breeds suspicion and
raises ethical concerns. Many U.S. citizens distrust vaccines
because the people who test, approve, recommend, and mandate
vaccines too often stand to profit from them. The government
can reduce vaccine hesitancy if it denies financial conflict of
interest waivers in the vaccine approval process to individuals
who, in at least one case, have reportedly earned millions of
dollars from vaccine sales, according to estimates.426 At the very
least, the U.S. government might consider barring
pharmaceutical industry executives from sitting on a committee
that helps determine whether a new vaccine should be given to
American children.427
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the government
could stop insulating the vaccine industry from civil liability for
injuries that its products cause. European nations have adopted
guidance that “affirms an individual’s right to sue vaccine
manufacturers for harms that she reasonably could not have
expected based on the product warnings and on the ‘particularly
high level of safety’ she is entitled to expect for vaccines.”428 The
implementation of this policy has neither caused a vaccinemarket
exodus nor an increase in vaccine prices in Europe.429 Affording
the public legal recourse against a for-profit vaccine industry
would ameliorate doubt and distrust, even if the government
continues to legally compel vaccination and grant conflict-of-
interest waivers. As the erstwhile CDC Director conceded after
422 See supra Section I.D.2.
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the 1976 swine flu pandemic, pharmaceutical industry demands
for vaccine-related limited liability suggested then that there was
something wrong with the vaccines it was selling.430 If the goal is
to persuade more parents that vaccines are as safe as
pharmaceutical companies and the government attest, then
continuing to afford blanket limited liability to the industry seems
entirely unnecessary and counterproductive from a public health
(and trust) perspective.
CONCLUSION
Vaccine hesitancy has unfortunately been on the rise for
decades in the United States.431 The crisis has serious
implications, as we are currently witnessing during the COVID-
19 pandemic. This article argues that vaccine hesitancy is the
direct byproduct of U.S. vaccine legislation. Mandatory
vaccination laws, lax regulation, and limited liability for vaccine
producers function together as a scaffolding upon which
parental doubts about immunizations rest. As vaccine hesitancy
amongst American parents continues to grow, federal and state
governments respond by bolstering the very legal structures
that produce and reinforce that doubt.432 Vaccine-hesitant
parents, in turn, respond to stronger vaccine legislation with
renewed and seemingly redoubled opposition to vaccines.433 This
article proposes a different solution to the public health crisis of
vaccine hesitancy. The government can destabilize the legal
foundations upon which vaccine hesitancy rests if it simply
amends or eliminates one or more of these legal structures. The
U.S. government can alleviate vaccine hesitancy among parents
simply by making more immunizations optional (as is the case
in many peer nations across the globe), eliminating financial
conflicts of interest in vaccine regulation, or allowing parents to
sue vaccine manufacturers when mandatory immunizations
harm their children. If the government amends one or more of
these legal structures, it can helpmitigate the dangers of vaccine
hesitancy and restore trust in an indispensable public health
tool.
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